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Abstract
Customary international law is an enigma.  It is produced by the decentralized actions of 
states, and it generally lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms.  Political science realists and 
some rationalist legal scholars argue that customary international law cannot affect state behavior:  
that it is “epiphenomenal.”    
This article develops a model of an n-person prisoner’s dilemma in the customary 
international law context that shows that it is plausible that states would comply with customary 
international law under certain circumstances.  These circumstances relate to:  (i) the relative 
value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the 
extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of cooperation or the 
detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons 
problem, a public good, or a network, (iv) the information available to the states involved 
regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of 
long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, 
(vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other 
multilateral relationships between the involved states. 
One implication of this model is that it lends credence to customary international law.  
From a research standpoint, this model identifies a number of parameters for which data may be 
developed in order to test the model.  From a policy standpoint, this model shows what types of 
contexts, including malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to reach stable 
and efficient equilibria in their customary international law relations.
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1. Introduction
Customary international law (CIL) forms the infrastructure of international law, 
and is also part of international law’s superstructure.  It thus serves as its own foundation, 
but also as the foundation for treaty law, and therefore for essentially all international 
law.  How firm is this foundation?   
CIL seems to have fallen on hard times, as it has been overtaken by treaty as the 
principal source of new rules in the international community, as it often seems to be used 
by idealists to make boot-strapping arguments about the content of international law, and 
as its binding force—its social effect—is often not readily apparent.1  This at a time when 
the domestic analog of CIL—social norms—is the darling of legal scholarship.
CIL is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent.  
By contrast, the central argument of this article is that CIL, while something of a trick of 
levitation, is theoretically plausible.  Our argument makes one central claim:  that while 
there are limits on and variations in the effectiveness of CIL, there are circumstances 
where it may independently affect the behavior of states.  There is no reason in theory, or 
in data adduced by others, to believe CIL generally epiphenomenal.  In addition, as a by-
product of the analysis supporting our central claim, we find that the CIL doctrine that 
has developed in order to discriminate between valid and invalid assertions of the 
existence of rules of CIL is internally coherent, and consistent with our model’s 
rationalist perspective on state behavior.
This article refines and extends an emerging rationalist understanding of CIL.2
Pioneering work in this field, notably that of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, has begun 
1 See generally, J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 449 (2000).
2 See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Afterword, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 201 (2001); Mark A. 
Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law:  A Response to Professors 
Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, 
International Customary Law and Articulation Theories:  An Economic Analysis, George 
Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-24, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=335220; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. 
Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary International Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 191 
(2001); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner 1999]; Andrew T. 
Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 
(2002); Francesco Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law, George Mason Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 01-06, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262032; Edward T. Swaine, Rational 
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to articulate a rationalist theory of CIL.  Goldsmith and Posner have argued that CIL (a) 
does not exogenously affect state behavior and (b) is internally incoherent, as states are 
not motivated by opinio juris to comply with CIL.3  We show why the first assertion is 
either tautological or incorrect as a matter of theory, and, to the extent that it purports to 
rely on factual observation, is not supported by the data presented.  The tautology arises 
from a false dichotomy between motivation by self-interest4 and motivation by law.  In a 
rationalist model, behavior is assumed to be motivated by self-interest.  If law is 
artificially separated from self-interest, then of course a rationalist model would assume 
that law has no motivating force.  Yet we show how CIL rules may modify the payoffs of 
behavior and therefore affect behavior through self-interest.  While CIL is endogenous to 
states as a group, it is an exogenous influence on the behavior of each individual state.  
CIL may affect behavior even if it only does so at the margins.  As to the second 
assertion, our analysis provides a plausible basis to assign a discriminating role to opinio 
juris, and therefore we find CIL doctrine internally coherent in at least its core dimension. 
This article develops an repeated multi-player prisoner’s dilemma model of CIL.  
Of course, game theory can only provide a crude representation of highly nuanced 
decision-making.5  Our analysis focuses on parameters of the multi-player prisoner’s 
dilemma in the CIL context:  (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the 
number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of 
states involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, 
including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public 
good, or a network, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding 
compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of 
long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of 
interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral 
relationships or other multilateral relationships between the involved states.
The parameters we identify are incorporated in our model as independent 
variables, but from a normative standpoint it is possible for policy initiatives to select or 
manipulate these parameters.  That is, by developing a positive theory suggesting the 
parameters for determining whether CIL will affect state behavior, this article opens the 
way to normative institutional design.6   States may determine to restructure certain 
Custom, 52:3 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States:  
International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 VA. L. REV. 
839 (2002).
3
   The leading article here is Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2.
4
    By “self-interest” we mean merely to refer to maximization of preferences—these 
preferences could be other-regarding or altruistic.
5 See the cautions expressed in Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, and the broader 
treatment in Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in Kenneth A. 
Oye, ed., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986).
6
    Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565 
(1995).
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institutions in order to facilitate the formation and operation of CIL.  There may be 
circumstances under which it will be normatively attractive to facilitate the development 
of CIL, rather than to engage in more self-conscious and static treaty-making.  The 
institutional dynamism and social immanence that attracts some scholars to social norms 
in the domestic context may also be attractive in at least some international contexts.  
This article is organized as follows.  The remainder of this introduction provides a 
short definition of CIL and briefly locates this article in relation to four literatures:  law 
and economics, social norms, international organization and industrial organization.  Part 
2 explains our choice of the repeated n-person prisoner’s dilemma as the basis for our 
model, as well as our choice of an assumed strategy for players within this model.  Part 3 
explains the other assumptions and parameters of our model.  Part 4 sets forth the formal 
model.  Part 5 presents some implications in terms of (i) the plausibility of CIL, (ii) 
policy, (iii) international law doctrine, and (iv) research.  Part 6 provides some plausible 
examples of n-person CIL.  Part 7 briefly concludes.
a. Customary International Law and its Doctrine
As an introductory matter, it is useful to review the fundamental definition of 
CIL.  Article 102 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law states that “[c]ustomary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  The 
sense of obligation is referred to in Latin as “opinio juris sive necessitatis.”  Article 
38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, listing the sources of 
international law applicable by the Court, includes “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”  
CIL has two core doctrinal problems relating to opinio juris.  First, can CIL ever 
come into existence if it requires opinio juris—a sense of legal obligation—before it can 
exist?  The second relates to the motivation of states.  Are states ever motivated by opinio 
juris?  The rationalist assumption of states motivated by their own preferences seems 
prima facie inconsistent with the CIL requirement of motivation by opinio juris, and this 
is the criticism that Goldsmith and Posner level at CIL doctrine.7  They argue that what 
appears to be CIL is not, because it is actually motivated by coincidence of interest, 
coercion, cooperation predicated on self-interest, or coordination predicated on self-
interest.  We respond to this argument in part 5.
For the social scientist studying law, the critical descriptive question relates to the 
effects of legal rules on behavior.  For CIL, this descriptive question is also a doctrinal 
question, as CIL doctrine requires some level of generality and consistency of practice—
some quantum of state behavior.  And again, at least under the Restatement formulation, 
this behavior must be motivated by opinio juris.  Under the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, the custom itself may serve as evidence of acceptance as law, of opinio 
7
   Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2.
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juris.  Some commentators have suggested that opinio juris in a formal sense may not be 
necessary at all, but that the requirement should be understood in terms of state consent 
or acceptance.8
As we address the theory of CIL, it is useful to have in mind some examples of 
CIL.  CIL exists in a wide variety of fields, and coexists in many areas with treaty law.  
As already noted, CIL is its own foundation.  Thus, there is a CIL of CIL.  In other 
words, the CIL doctrine discussed above is understood as law pursuant to CIL.  
Furthermore, the law of treaties came into existence pursuant to CIL, although this law is 
today codified in treaty.  But moving beyond these foundational areas, CIL addresses, for 
example, issues of territorial integrity, jurisdiction to apply law, diplomatic immunity, the 
rights of states with respect to coastal areas, human rights, cross-border pollution and the 
use of force to settle international disputes.  
These are diverse fields, each with its own characteristics.  Our theoretical 
approach calls for discrimination among these fields.  The model set forth below 
indicates the parameters for discrimination.  Simply put, we would expect greater 
possibility for formation of and compliance with CIL in some fields than in others.  Of 
course, this is an area in which empiricism would require analysis of areas in which CIL 
has not developed:  the dog that did not bark.  Thus, we might ask, why is there no CIL 
rule that prohibits over-fishing in international waters?  Why is there no CIL rule that 
requires extradition of criminals?    
Our theoretical approach also accepts the possibility of linkage among diverse 
fields, integrating and therefore homogenizing the behavioral effect of each rule of law.
b. Four Literatures
This article draws on four semi-autonomous literatures.  First, as noted above, 
there is an emerging rationalist, law and economics-based literature of CIL.  The leading 
work in this area is by Goldsmith and Posner, but there are other important contributions. 
Second, this article draws on a burgeoning literature on social norms in the law, although 
social norms are studied by all manner of social scientists.  Third, this article draws on
the economics field of industrial organization game for game theory-based insights about 
collusion among competitors in markets.  Fourth, this article draws on the political 
science literature of international organization, which has addressed in detail the game 
theoretic analysis of cooperation among groups of states.  
i. Law and Economics of CIL
Goldsmith and Posner provide a game theoretic analysis of CIL.  They examine a 
variety of CIL circumstances, and argue that they can be categorized into four game 
8
    Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 268-293 (1998).
The Customary International Law Supergame
July 13, 2004
5
types:  (i) coincidence of interest, (ii) coercion, (iii) bilateral cooperation, and (iv) 
bilateral coordination.  This is a useful exercise, as it invites us to consider the motivation 
of states, and the degree to which CIL affects behavior.  In the perhaps hypothetical cases 
of pure coincidence of interest and coercion, Goldsmith and Posner are correct that there 
can be no opinio juris, and that law does little work.  This is not new to CIL doctrine, but 
it is useful to emphasize.  It is also useful to emphasize that Goldsmith and Posner seem 
to assume a purity of motivation that may not exist in the real world.  
Goldsmith and Posner suggest that many instances of observed CIL may be 
understood in terms of bilateral cooperation along the lines of a bilateral prisoner’s 
dilemma game.  They then argue that “Although game theory does not rule out the 
possibility of n-state cooperation, the assumptions required for such an outcome are quite 
strong and usually unrealistic. For this reason, we doubt the utility of n-player prisoner's 
dilemmas as an explanation for multilateral or ‘universal’ behavioral regularities.”9  Their 
views with respect to coordination games are similar.
In addition to developing this theoretical perspective, Goldsmith and Posner 
examine several examples of CIL.  The areas they consider are neutrality, diplomatic 
immunity and maritime jurisdiction.  They find that in these areas, states were motivated 
by coincidence of interest, coercion or a bilateral reciprocity along the lines of the 
prisoner’s dilemma.  They conclude that if state behavior can be explained by 
coincidence of interest or coercion, or any other self-interested-motivation, then neither 
opinio juris nor CIL does any motivational work.  
ii. Social Norms 
We might ask, however, whether the CIL problem is different in structure from 
the social norms context, and whether if social norms can affect behavior, CIL can as 
well.   Since the publication by Robert Ellickson of Order Without Law10 in 1991, legal 
scholars have examined the role of informal norms in society, and the relationship of 
these norms to law.  Ellickson investigates how cattle farmers in Shasta County, 
California, manage to establish and apply their own non-legal rules, with a notable level 
of compliance, without direct intervention by the state.  It is an insightful story about how 
order can arise without law, or in spite of law.11
We may draw a rough, and limited, analogy between the development of social 
norms in a municipal, or private setting,12 and the development of CIL in the international 
9
     Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1130.
10 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
11
    However, one might argue that the general legal system, including especially its rules 
against violence, forms an important background or infrastructure that may provide 
support to the farmers' social norms.  
12
   For a recent work synthesizing and extending some of the social norms learning, see
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).  See also Richard H. McAdams, Book 
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public setting.   In the international community, CIL is substantively similar to the 
phenomenon Ellickson describes.13 In international political science, regime theorists 
such as Robert Keohane,14 Stephen Krasner, and Beth Simmons15 have told a similar 
story of the possible rise of order in international society.   However, regime theory has 
generally avoided CIL.16  Moreover, recognition that a rule has become part of CIL may 
signal its support by, or linkage with, the multi- sector CIL system.  This system of 
accepted and enforced linkage may distinguish legal rules from non-legal regimes.
The difference between law and social norms in the municipal setting is that law 
is the province of the state (setting aside for the moment religious law, other non-state 
rules, and circumstances in which non-state made rules are incorporated in the state-
enforced law).17  However, this distinction is inapposite to the international system, 
which has been characterized as a horizontal, as opposed to vertical, system, where there 
is no overarching state, per se.18  So, in the international system, there is more overlap, 
and an indistinct border, between law and social norms.  This overlap is perhaps easier to 
see in the international context than in the domestic context, as, in the international 
context, a significant subset of social norms is termed "law."  
Ellickson states that the social norms literature defines a “social norm” as “a rule 
governing an individual’s behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely 
Review:  Signaling Discount Rates:  Law, Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE 
L.J. 625 (2001).
13
   For an example of this type of analogical allegory, comparing domestic custom to 
international custom, see Mendelson, supra note 8, at 165-168.  For an early statement 
that CIL is produced in an evolutionary fashion, see ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE 
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (Cornell 1971).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:  COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER:  ESSAY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
(1989).
15 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983);  Stephen D. 
Krasner & Beth Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491 (1987).
16
   Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 121, 124 (1996).
17
   While there is no state at the global level, there is an international legal and 
organizational order, which is quite a bit more fragmented than most nation-states.
18
   We add this qualification, because one might argue that the CIL and conventional law 
framework, as it exists, is at least comparable to a municipal state, or at least that this 
framework is comparable to the constitution that a municipal state might have.  Of 
course, while it responds to some of the same questions, including a rule of recognition, it 
is not as detailed or fertile as a constitution.
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enforce by means of social sanctions.”19  The focus of this definition on decentralized 
means of enforcement shows the strong analogy between social norms in the municipal 
setting and CIL in the international setting.  Of course, to the extent that courts may 
apply, and institutions of global governance may enforce, CIL, there is a difference.  But 
this application and enforceability is quite limited.  There are few circumstances in which 
CIL rules benefit from mandatory adjudication in international tribunals.  We would not 
consider application of CIL by domestic courts to amount to the action of “state agents” 
at the international level, although action by domestic courts would certainly be 
considered action of “state agents” at the municipal level.  This is because in the 
international context, domestic courts are simply internal deliberative processes of 
national governments.  The application by domestic courts of CIL may be understood as 
a kind of norm internalization.20
One important set of explanations of social norms understands norms as 
preferences that individuals (or in our case states) acquire through education, 
acculturation or other processes, such as an expressive or articulation function.21 It may 
well be possible to modify preferences of states through social norms.  It seems obvious 
that the way to modify the preferences of states is to modify the preferences of individual 
government officials, or voters.  Indeed, it may be appropriate to consider epistemic 
communities and networks among government officials.  While this approach may have 
traction in the CIL setting, and may re-emphasize the role of legitimacy, justice and 
morality as bases for preference-modification, this article will bypass that discussion, and 
focus on exogenous explanations of social norms.23  Modeling always involves 
19
   Robert Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms:  A Perspective from the Legal 
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).  Note 
that Ellickson assumes multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, retaliation.
20 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (reviewing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)).  
This internalization may be desirable under certain circumstances, and may be developed 
as a tool of enforcement of CIL.  That is, states may persuade one another to harness their 
domestic legal system for certain of their international legal obligations, effectively 
holding the domestic legal system hostage.  See also Philip Moremen & Joel P. 
Trachtman, Whose Right is it Anyway?  Private Parties in EC-U.S. Dispute Settlement at 
the WTO, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 221 (2003).
21 See Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEG. STUDS. 585 
(1998).
22 JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 15 (1989).
23
    Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000);  Robert C. Cooter, Models of Morality 
in Law and Economics:  Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of 
Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 911-912 (1998); JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY:  A 
STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989).  Basu refers to these as “preference-changing norms.”  
The Customary International Law Supergame
July 13, 2004
8
simplification, and our goal in this paper is to elaborate a rationalist model for future 
testing.  In fact, testing a rationalist model would help to clarify the debate between 
exogenous preferences and endogenous preferences.
In connection with exogenous explanations, the law-based social norms literature 
has not embraced the repeated n-person prisoner’s dilemma.24 This is due to two types of 
concerns.  First, there are concerns that game theory does not reflect the nuance of social 
interaction.  We hope that the incorporation in our model of multi-sector contact helps to 
address this concern.  Second, there are concerns about individual rationality:  the 
subgame perfection of third-party enforcement.25  We address these concerns below.
iii. Industrial Organization
Much of our understanding of the utility, structure and dynamics of n-person
prisoner’s dilemma games comes from the economics literature of industrial 
organization.  This literature considers the possibility that firms may enter into cartels or 
other restrictions of competition that violate antitrust laws.  While firms may find 
opportunities to communicate, their communications and agreements must be kept secret 
from the regulatory authorities and are not enforceable at law.  An important concern for 
industrial organization economists is to identify circumstances under which such 
agreements can be made self-sustaining through the self-interest of the parties to the 
agreement.     
While the analogy is apparent, we must recognize, of course, that in the CIL 
setting, public communication is possible, as are agreements that at least purport to be 
binding:  treaties.  The degree to which agreements may actually constrain behavior is a 
question for another paper, but we point out that the international legal rule that treaties 
must be observed (pacta sunt servanda) is itself part of CIL.  
Another, perhaps more important, distinction is that a cartel has certain 
characteristics that may differ from any particular CIL setting.  That is, in a cartel, the 
more others adhere to the cartel, the greater the monetary incentives for any particular 
member to defect.  This context is more like a commons problem than like a public good 
problem.  We will discuss some of these distinctions based on payoff structures below.
iv. International Organization
See Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476 (1998).  
24 See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the 
Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2003).  Mahoney and Sanchirico explain the 
state of the social norms literature with respect to the n-person prisoner’s dilemma.  They 
explain that the objection to these models is that third party enforcement is not 
individually rational:  that the incentives of the players break down.
25 Id. at note 12, citing work by Ellickson, Katz, McAdams and Posner.
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Political scientists and economists working in the field of international 
organization have made a good deal of progress in analyzing the problem of international 
cooperation more generally.  In various works, they have examined most of the 
parameters that we utilize here.26  This literature has not examined CIL.  
We have structured our model to match most closely the CIL context, rather than 
attempt to structure a model that would address other international cooperation devices.  
However, we recognize that the question of which device—treaty, CIL or softer law—
itself depends on a set of variables.  We also recognize that CIL may be understood as a 
phase in the formalization of law, or in “legalization.”27 The International Law 
Commission of the United Nations often codifies CIL, and CIL often forms the basis for 
treaties.  This article does not present an explanation of choice between custom and 
treaty, or of the relationship among these instruments.28
The model we present here formalizes certain considerations that remain informal 
in much of the political science literature, and has other varying features that we describe 
below.   
2. The N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In this section we explain our choice of the n-person prisoner’s dilemma as the 
basic model for the CIL problem, examine the potential strategies that might be played 
within this game, and explain some of our assumptions.  The n-person repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma is really a group of varying models, with a number of varying features, 
including the number of players and their preferences.  
26
   There is disagreement between institutionalists and “realists,” who claim that states’ 
interests in international relations are characterized by a search for relative gains, rather 
than absolute gains.  These realists reject the possibility of cooperation where it results in 
relative gains to a competitor.  See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Nice Strategies in a 
World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy 37 J. CONFL. RES. 
427 (1993); Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations 
Theory, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1303 (1991); Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the 
Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 701 (1991).
27 See the special issue of International Organization devoted to the phenomenon of 
“legalization.”  54:3 INT’L ORG. (2000). 
28 See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. (2000); John K. Setear, Treaty, Custom, Iteration and Public 
Choice, February 2004, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=492604 (arguing that custom 
is more attractive to executive branches).  To the extent that CIL is less detailed—less 
specific—than treaty norms, it is amenable to a rules versus standards type of analysis.  
See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
577 (1992); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 333, 346-47 (1999).
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a. Choice of Game
As we consider the application of game theory to the CIL setting, it should be 
noted that there is a wide choice of potential game structures to apply.29  The basic payoff 
structure assumed in the prisoner’s dilemma game captures the essential problem of 
cooperation in a horizontal social setting with externalities,30 in which parties have a 
choice between compliance and defection under circumstances in which they can enrich 
themselves individually through defection while they could enrich society through 
compliance.31  Of course, some CIL contexts might be better modeled using other 
methods, but by using the prisoner’s dilemma we hope to capture the essence of informal 
contracting under opposed interests.32
One of the reasons that we choose this game is because it allows us to 
contextualize a number of insights and concerns that cannot easily be included in other 
analytical models.  For example, we believe that the n-person prisoner’s dilemma can 
take account of a number of the diverse considerations often referred to together as 
29
   For a useful analysis of the “fit” of other games, including “battle of the sexes” and 
“stag hunt,” see Swaine, supra note 2.  See also Fiona McGillivray & Alastair Smith, 
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments, 54 INT'L ORG. 809, 810 
(2000) (noting that the prisoner’s dilemma is often used to model international 
cooperation). 
30
   By use of the term “externalities,” we mean to be quite inclusive, including both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities:  any circumstance in which an action by one 
state has adverse or beneficial effects on another state.
31
  At another level of complexity, it would be possible to model the game of formation of 
a CIL rule separately from enforcement.   See James D. Fearon, Bargaining, 
Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52:2 INT’L. ORG. 269 (1998) (separating 
the bargaining problem, modeled as a coordination game, from the enforcement problem, 
modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma); Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and 
National Power:  Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 (1991) (arguing that 
many international issues are better modeled as coordination games).   Fearon’s two stage 
approach may be more appropriate to the treaty context than to the custom context.  
Fearon points out that relatively large “shadows of the future” might inhibit bargaining to 
achieve an initial coordination game agreement, while making the enforcement game 
more tractable.  In the CIL context, there is less natural separation, and there may even be 
first mover advantages that would counteract the effect Fearon suggests.  Finally, our 
interest in this article is not so much in establishing CIL rules, as in enforcing them.
32
    For a discussion of the use of coordination games to model certain types of 
international contexts, see Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, & Duncan Snidal, The 
Rational Design of International Institutions, 55:4 INT’L ORG. 761, 774 (2001); Duncan 
Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma:  Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes, 79:4 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
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“reputation” or “reputational sanctions.”33   We also believe that the n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma must be at the core of a rationalist explanation of the effectiveness of social 
norms.  Finally, we believe that the n-person prisoner’s dilemma offers parsimony:  the 
factors that it takes into account seem necessary, and there are no factors that seem 
superfluous. 
In a non-cooperative, single-play circumstance, with a standard prisoner’s 
dilemma payoff structure, we would expect non-compliance.34  This is each player’s 
dominant strategy, and a Nash equilibrium35 because under the payoffs assumed in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, each party is better off defecting, no matter what the other party 
does.  Therefore, under the rather restrictive assumptions of the true prisoner’s dilemma, 
the parties each invariably choose the strategy that results in reduced individual welfare, 
and reduced aggregate welfare, compared to the non-defecting strategy.  This is an 
inefficient outcome.  By analogy, states playing the CIL game (assuming prisoner’s 
dilemma-type payoffs) in a bilateral single-play setting would fail to form or comply with 
a CIL rule that increased individual and aggregate welfare.  Cooperation is strongly 
dominated, and the unique Nash equilibrium is for both states to defect.36  The same is 
true of a prisoner’s dilemma game repeated a finite number of times known in advance to 
the players.  Now the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is for each player to defect in 
each period.  “A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile that induces a Nash 
equilibrium in every subgame.”37
This conclusion is inescapable in theory, given the constraints of the game:  by 
definition, the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game is an inefficient strategic 
equilibrium.  This conclusion presents a normative goal:  to modify the real world 
circumstances so as to produce stable equilibria that are efficient.  This is the major role 
of CIL, and of international law generally.
Of course, in a world of effective third-party enforcement of agreements, the 
response to the prisoner’s dilemma is clear:  the parties enter into a binding agreement to 
cooperate, thereby modifying the payoff structure and escaping the prisoner’s dilemma.  
The prisoner’s dilemma assumes, however, that its prisoners are held separately, and 
cannot negotiate, reach, or enforce a binding agreement.  
In the CIL setting, there is no court of general mandatory jurisdiction nor any 
publicly appointed “policeman.”  While we may draw analogies to the World Court and 
33 See Guzman, supra note 2.
34 STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 98 (1993).
35
   A “dominant strategy” is one which, no matter what the other player does, will 
provide a higher payoff to the acting player.  A “Nash equilibrium” is a set of “strategies 
such that each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies.”  
DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 11 (1991).
36 Id. at 111.
37 M.J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (Oxford University Press, 2004).
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the U.N., these institutions have substantial differences compared to domestic courts and 
police.  Therefore, we begin by assuming that there is no capacity to make agreements 
that are binding.  This is obviously a simplifying assumption.  Our model is meant to
show that there are substitutes for formal binding agreements.
In the CIL game, there are five important distinctions from the assumptions of 
non-cooperative game theory in general, and the prisoner’s dilemma in particular.  First, 
the players can communicate with one another, and can do so more readily today than 
during the classical period of formation of CIL.  Second, the players can enter into 
treaties that are at least somewhat binding.  Third, states play a repeated game with one 
another with no defined end date, and so can respond at a later time to something done at 
an earlier time.  Updating of information and punishment are possible.  Fourth, not only 
is the narrow game characterized by a particular CIL rule, like the three-mile territorial 
sea, but it is embedded in a dense fabric of relationships.  Fifth, information regarding 
compliance is often readily accessible; more so today, it would appear, than during the 
19th century.  Each of these distinctions alone may be sufficient to transform the game 
into something quite different from the prisoner’s dilemma—while nothing resolves the 
true prisoner’s dilemma, modifications may result in stable and efficient equilibria.  
Indeed, it may be useful to use cooperative game theory to analyze some CIL 
circumstances.38
As will be illustrated below, one of the more difficult types of multilateral 
cooperation problem is a commons problem in which, as in the cartel context, incentives 
to defect increase with the number of other states that comply.  Where incentives to 
defect increase with the number of players, we would expect the most severe challenge to 
cooperation.  Not all CIL contexts exhibit this characteristic.  
Observation suggests that even certain commons problems, or other prisoner’s 
dilemma-type circumstances, may achieve resolution despite theory.  Elinor Ostrom 
states that “[a] substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that self-
interested individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and
the reality that such cooperative behavior is widespread, although far from inevitable.”39
Ostrom cites considerable evidence regarding the amount and circumstances of 
cooperation by individuals in n-person collective action problems.  The evidence shows 
that individuals contribute to the resolution of these problems in substantially greater 
amounts than the standard prisoner’s dilemma model would suggest.  Of course, much of 
the evidence is obtained in circumstances where the assumptions of the prisoner’s
38
    For an application of cooperative game theory in the international context, see Daniel 
G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, A Cooperative Game Theory of Non-Contiguous Allies, 3 J. 
PUB. ECON. THEORY 391 (2000) (applying cooperative game theory to international 
security arrangements).
39
   Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14:3 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 137, 138 (2000).
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dilemma are violated—by allowing individuals to communicate, enter into agreements 
and repeat play.  
We do not deploy any statistically significant data in this article.  However, we 
advance a plausible theory of potentially stable and efficient equilibria in the n-person
prisoner’s dilemma, and suggest some possible approaches to empirical testing.    
b. Choice of Strategy
Within the prisoner’s dilemma, we must postulate a particular strategy for states 
to play.  There are many choices.  We mention only three:  tit-for-tat, grim trigger, and 
penance.  
i. Bilateral or Multilateral Retaliation
An important aspect of the structure of the game pertains to the ability to impose 
sanctions in a discriminatory manner.  States may have trouble discriminating in the 
application of sanctions for several reasons.  First, they may not be able to obtain 
information regarding the author of the violation.  This might occur, for example, with 
respect to pollution at sea, or terrorist attack.  Second, it may be costly for states to 
respond in a discriminating way.  For example, if the sanction involves trade barriers, the 
sanctioning state must instruct its customs officers to discriminate among goods by 
origin.  Third, and most important, the relevant good being produced by cooperation may 
be non-excludable.  This would occur with the provision of public goods or the protection 
of international commons.  To the extent that states are unable to discriminate, their 
retaliation, if any, must be multilateral, instead of bilateral.  This obviously limits the 
strategies that they are able to play and the relationships that they may enter into. Thus, 
given that the strategies available to a state are “cooperate” or “defect,” there are at least 
two possibilities that we need to consider in connection with a multilateral game:
(i) Defection by state i against state j leads to punishment of i only by state j: 
bilateral defection leads to bilateral punishment; or
(ii) Defection by state i against state j leads to punishment of i by all states: 
bilateral defection leads to multilateral punishment.
We focus our analysis on (i) for three reasons.  First, it makes the analysis simpler 
without changing any of the qualitative conclusions.   Second, multilateral retaliation 
simply increases the incentives to comply over bilateral retaliation.   Since (i) involves 
milder punishment of defection than (ii), the conditions that support cooperation with 
bilateral punishment under (i) will certainly support cooperation with multilateral 
punishment under (ii).  In other words, where multilateral punishment is possible, the 
conditions that we identify below are sufficient but not necessary to support a multilateral 
rule: any discount factor that supports a multilateral CIL rule with bilateral punishment 
will also support such a rule with multilateral punishment.  Third, there is some force to 
the argument that (i) is a more plausible scenario than (ii) in most of the situations in 
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which the formulation of CIL is likely to be considered.  Articles 42, 48 and 54 of the 
International Law Commission’s Rules on State Responsibility40 generally prevent 
retaliation by third states for truly bilateral injury, while there seems no basis for 
retaliation by an injured state against non-injuring states.  These rules seem to limit the 
formal possibility for multilateral sanctions against truly bilateral defection.  
Thus, in our model, we assume that retaliation is applied bilaterally—that if state i
defects vis-à-vis state j, only state j will respond, and only against state i.  If multiple 
states responded against state i, it would simply make cooperation more likely by 
increasing the punishment for defection.  
Given (i), we can represent a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma game as a set of 
bilateral games, with a typical bilateral game being as specified in Table 1 (page 29).  As 
will be seen below, this is not the same as assuming a bilateral game.  Rather, it is a 
multilateral game with bilateral punishment.  
ii. Tit-for-Tat
Under “tit-for-tat,” states may respond to defection with a single defection.  Tit-
for-tat is one of the most frequently-discussed strategies in connection with repeated 
prisoner’s dilemmas.  While tit-for-tat may win evolutionary games,41 it is not subgame 
perfect:  after a defection, the wronged state will have incentives to accept an undertaking 
from the defecting state that it will cooperate in future.  Subgame perfection means that at 
every stage of a repeated game, no player will have an incentive to deviate from the 
equilibrium strategy, even when others do.  Even more devastating to tit-for-tat is the fact 
that once one state defects the game cycles endlessly between defection and 
compliance.42
iii. Grim Trigger
Second, states may respond to defection with defection forever:  a bilateral “grim 
trigger” strategy.  There are two basic approaches that have been developed in the theory 
of repeated games.  The first assumes that any deviation is met with a response that 
maximizes the loss that the deviator suffers – a “minmax” strategy – even if this imposes 
costs on the punishers.  The second approach assumes that deviation results in reversion 
40
    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at 
<www.un.org/law/ilc>, subsequently noted by the General Assembly in A/RES/56/83, 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted 12 Dec. 2001.  These 
articles do not themselves represent international law, but are an attempt to codify 
existing custom.
41 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
42 Id., at 138.
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to the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma game.  We adopt the latter 
approach since it appears to be more appealing to players.  Essentially, we assume that in 
the event of deviation the states revert to the strategies that they would have adopted if no 
CIL rule had developed in the first place.  The grim trigger strategy is subgame perfect, 
as it calls for a reversion to the dominant strategy of defection in response to an initial 
defection.   
Goldsmith and Posner appear to recognize the possibility for stable and efficient 
equilibria under certain circumstances where states play the grim trigger strategy.43
However, using an overfishing of commons context as their example, they suggest that 
the grim trigger is not used and would be collectively irrational.  In his interesting work 
on treaties relating to environmental commons problems,44 Barrett also rejects the grim 
trigger strategy because it fails to satisfy the criterion of collective rationality.  The 
collective rationality consideration is a formal articulation of an intuitive concern that it 
would be extraordinarily wasteful to abandon an efficient multilateral agreement because 
of a single defection.  While it would be individually rational to respond with defection 
forever—it is subgame perfect as the reversion to the Nash equilibrium—it is collectively 
irrational insofar as rational negotiators will have incentives to renegotiate a cooperative 
arrangement after defection. 
With respect to the more empirical question of whether a grim trigger is used, if 
we think not about the CIL that exists, but about the CIL that does not exist, it is clear 
that states do play the grim trigger strategy at least in some contexts.  In fact, one might 
argue that the multilateral grim trigger is the existing default strategy in CIL.  That is, 
where a CIL rule exists or is proposed for formation, and one state deviates, that may be 
sufficient provocation to cause others to deviate forever in response:  to kill the rule 
multilaterally.
The theoretical problem with grim trigger is that because it is collectively 
irrational it is not “renegotiation-proof.”45   That is, after a defection, a coalition of states 
will have incentives to come together and cooperate with the defector, depriving the grim 
trigger of credibility and therefore effectiveness.  The reasoning is that equilibrium 
strategies that enforce cooperative outcomes by the use of this type of punishment can be 
undermined by the deviator offering to renegotiate, proposing that the punishment phase 
be abandoned in favor of a return to cooperation: a “let bygones be bygones” argument.46
43
   Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1129-1130.
44
   Scott Barrett, A Theory of Full International Cooperation, 11 J. THEORETICAL POL. 
519 (1999); SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: STRATEGIES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (2003).
45 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES 
& ECON. BEHAVIOR (1989); Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 174.
46
   Indeed, this is not uncommon in international law discourse.  See, e.g., Scott M. 
Sullivan, Changing The Premise Of International Legal Remedies: The Unfounded 
The Customary International Law Supergame
July 13, 2004
16
An obvious counterargument to this, of course, is that renegotiation unravels by “forward 
induction.”  That is, once the players understand that defection and promises of future 
compliance will go on indefinitely, would they not decline to renegotiate the first time? 
Also, in the CIL context, we are operating on the assumption that states do not have the 
possibility of forming binding agreements through renegotiation, preventing this 
indefinite defection. 47
Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which such renegotiation is possible, 
and the offer to renegotiate and abide by the results is credible.  If so, an alternative 
“renegotiation-proof” equilibrium is needed.  We offer the penance strategy described 
below as a “weakly renegotiation proof” alternative.  
iv. Penance
While a precise definition of renegotiation-proofness has not yet been agreed, the 
treatment by Farrell and Maskin is worth considering.48  They define a “weak 
renegotiation proof” (WRP) equilibrium for an infinitely repeated game to be a subgame 
perfect equilibrium strategy profile that is not Pareto-dominated by any other subgame 
perfect strategy profile.  Using this definition, the grim trigger strategy profile is not 
WRP, since after defection the payoffs to cooperation Pareto-dominate those of
punishment.  If renegotiation is possible and credible, the states will prefer to renegotiate 
after a defection.
“Penance”49, by contrast, is subgame perfect and is “weakly renegotiation-
proof.”50  Under penance, the response to defection is counter-defection that is continued 
until the original defector accepts a period of punishment after which all players return to 
cooperation.  That is, in the event of defection, the victim retaliates by defecting until the 
initial defector accepts a period of punishment, by cooperating while the victim defects.   
A form of penance seems to be endorsed by the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations for application in international law generally.  Articles 49 to 54 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility provide that countermeasures may be used only to induce 
Adoption Of Assurances And Guarantees Of Non-Repetition, 7 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & 
FOR. AFF.  265 (2002-2003).
47
   Barrett notes that collective rationality is less of an issue in the field of domestic 
antitrust law, because renegotiation of an agreement in restraint of trade is illegal.  
Barrett, supra note 44, at 11.
48
   Farrell & Maskin, supra note 45.
49 See Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 179-182.  “Penance” is sometimes referred 
to as “getting even.”   See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY:  ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT
326-27 (1991).
50
    Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 180, citing Farrell & Maskin, supra note 45, at 
327; Eric van Damme, Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
47 J. ECON. THEORY 206 (1989).
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a state to cease a wrongful act and to make reparations;51 they must be commensurate 
with the injury.52
v. Equilibrium Selection and Coordination
One of the problems in an n-person prisoner’s dilemma is identifying the strategy 
that other players are playing and coordinating on a single strategy.  Fudenberg and 
Tirole conclude:  “Thus, repeated play with patient players not only makes 
‘cooperation’—meaning efficient payoffs—possible, it also leads to a large set of other 
equilibrium outcomes.  Several methods have been proposed to reduce this multiplicity of 
equilibria; however, none of them has yet been widely accepted, and the problem remains 
a topic of research.”53  Under circumstances of multiple equilibria, “anything that tends to 
focus the players’ attention on one particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly 
recognized, tends to make this the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus 
actually implement.”54  While there is no formal solution to this problem, states may 
coordinate through diplomacy, through other communication, or through their actions 
advancing particular customary rules. The selection among multiple equilibria may be 
understood as a separate, coordination game.  Here, CIL, for example as reflected in the 
Rules of State Responsibility, may also play a role.  
3. Assumptions Within the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
Having selected the n-person repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, and the penance 
or grim trigger strategy, in this section, we develop the more specific parameters and 
assumptions of our model.
a. Efficiency and Symmetry 
We assume that failure to reach a cooperative equilibrium—failure to reach an 
implicit agreement—is inefficient.  Of course, there are many circumstances in which no 
implicit agreement is needed, and reaching one would be inefficient.  However, our goal 
is to examine strategic barriers to implicit agreement; reducing these barriers would 
always increase efficiency, just as reducing the general barriers to contract between 
private parties would always increase efficiency without requiring that parties contract in 
every circumstance.  This perspective is consistent with the first theorem of welfare 
economics, the Coase Theorem, and the “efficiency principle”:  “If people are able to 
bargain together effectively, and can effectively implement and enforce their decisions, 
then the outcomes of economic activity will tend to be efficient (at least for the parties to 
51 See The Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, Nos. 7, 9, 17, 19 (obligation to 
make reparations).
52 See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817 
(2002).
53 Id. at 112.
54 Myerson, supra note 49, at 371.
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the bargain).”55  If the barriers to bargaining are eliminated, and parties reach no bargain, 
we may assume that there was no Pareto improving bargain available.
So, we assume payoffs along the lines of the classic prisoner’s dilemma.  Even 
within this category, there is variation.  Some circumstances will be more like a commons 
problem, or a cartel, in which the greater the number of players that comply, the greater 
the incentives to defect.  Others will be the opposite, based on network effects, public 
goods or economies of scale:  the more players that comply, the greater the incentives to 
comply.  In other cases, the payoffs from defection may not be substantially greater than 
the payoffs to compliance.  
Different players may be affected differently by defection or compliance.  
Certainly in the CIL field there are notable cases of asymmetry.  For example, a state 
with an extensive diplomatic service will have more at stake in connection with a rule of 
diplomatic immunity.  A land-locked state may have a different perspective on the 
territorial sea than a state with extensive coastlines.  Asymmetry affects each state’s 
incentives to comply.  Linkage among varying issues may either increase or decrease 
asymmetry.56
b. Identity and Number of Players
The skepticism of prior work regarding the possibility for non-defecting 
multilateral equilibria even in non-cooperative games is misplaced.  The industrial 
organization literature recognizes important possibilities for cooperative outcomes in 
multilateral settings.  The same seems to apply to the CIL game. 
The number of players in any particular instance of the CIL game will vary.  The 
maximum number of players is the total number of states in the world, although even this 
may ignore some detail.  There are other players besides states, including sub-state 
governmental entities, international government entities, non-government organizations 
and individuals, so we have a potentially unlimited universe.  In this paper, we assume 
“billiard ball” states.  While we recognize that we lose nuance by doing this, we are 
trying to work with a simple model that assumes that states have unitary preferences.  
Even limiting our universe to states, with approximately 200 in the world, there 
would seem to be a significant problem of obtaining information about positions and 
practices, as well as coordination.  However, while states may possess formal sovereign 
55 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 
24 (1992).
56 While our model deals with games in which information is common knowledge, 
Parisi develops the Harsanyian concept of stochastic symmetry and role reversibility:  the 
longer the shadow of the future, the less any one state can be certain of the way in which 
it will be affected by a particular rule See Parisi, supra note 2.  See also, Robert O. 
Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36:2 INT’L ORG. 325 (1982).
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equality, they are not substantively equal, and their participation in the CIL formation 
process is not homogeneous.57
Oscar Schachter writes that “As a historical fact, the great body of CIL was made 
by remarkably few States.  Only the States with navies—perhaps 3 or 4—made most of 
the law of the sea.  Military power, exercised on land and sea, shaped the customary law 
of war and, to a large degree, the customary rules on territorial rights and principles of 
State responsibility.”58  This leaves us with a game in which the number of players varies, 
depending on the degree of implication of their interests, and depending on their ability to 
affect outcomes.  In this game, players are heterogeneous across a number of parameters, 
including interest and power, and as will be seen below, discount factors.  In this sense, 
we may think of powerful states engaging in the CIL formation and maintenance game as 
exerting power through the articulation, formation and maintenance of CIL rules.  
Schachter wrote of general CIL, but it is also possible to have regional or other 
plurilateral CIL.59
The number of players may vary widely, depending on the subject matter at issue, 
the preferences of states that are implicated, the information dynamics, the ability of 
states to organize to influence the development of legal rules, and other parameters.  
There will also be wide asymmetries of interest that reduce the effective number of 
players.  Small states would ordinarily find it futile to try to influence the development of 
norms that interest large states, unless the small states are able to form a coalition to press 
their interests.  So, as we consider the number of players, we will make some simplifying 
assumptions.
Some of the leading authors in this field are skeptical of the possibility for 
multilateral customary processes to result in stable and efficient strategic equilibria under 
circumstances other than pure self-interest or coercion.  For example, Goldsmith and 
Posner see little possibility for either coordination or cooperation (the term they use for 
57 See Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in 
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 91, 99 (John G. Ruggie, ed. 1993) (suggesting techniques, 
including delegation as in the Security Council, of reducing the effective number of 
players).
58
   Oscar Schachter, New Custom:  Power, Opinio Juris, and Contrary Practice, in Jerzy 
Makarczyk, ed., THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSK, 531, 536 (Kluwer 1996).  
See also Mendelson, supra note 8, at 194, 215, 225 (in the past, “civilized” states were 
considered sufficient, and the applicable group of states need not be geographically 
constrained).
59 See Asylum Case (Haya de la Torre), 1950 I.C.J. 266; Case Concerning the Right of 
Passage Over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. 6.  Cf. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 72-73 (4th ed. 1997); Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 627, 706-25 (2001).  
60
   Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 32, at 777.
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resolution of a prisoner’s dilemma) in multilateral settings.61  While they see the 
possibility for stable and efficient equilibria in certain bilateral settings, they assume that 
"the bilateral prisoner's dilemma cannot in any event be generalized to the situation of 
multilateral cooperation, which is such an important part of the traditional account."62  In 
this connection, they follow an established tradition, led by Mancur Olson in 1965:
[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests.63
Olson based his perspective on the assumptions that the benefit of cooperation 
declines with the number of players, that the costs of monitoring increase with the 
number of players, and that the costs of organizing retaliation increase with the number 
of players.64  However, it can readily be seen that these are conjectures about the world,65
and are not necessarily true of any particular circumstance.  Moreover, these are only a 
subset of the parameters worth considering.  Finally, technological and social change has 
made it easier in some circumstance to monitor and to organize retaliation.66  Our model 
provides a broader context in which to consider these, and other, parameters.  
Oye identifies three slightly different ways in which increasing the number of 
players reduces the likelihood of cooperation:  (i) increasing transaction costs, (ii) 
increased heterogeneity of discount factors67 among larger numbers of players, and (iii) 
61 Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1132.
62 Id.
63 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965).  See also Kenneth A. 
Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy:  Hypotheses and Strategies, in 
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye, ed. 1986).  
64
    Olson, supra note 63, at 48.
65 RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 43 (1982).
66 See Arthur Lupia & Gisela Sin, Which Public Goods are Endangered?:  How 
Evolving Communication Technologies Affect the Logic of Collective Action, 117 PUBLIC 
CHOICE 315 (2003); Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency:  Information Systems 
in International Regimes, 42 INT’L STUDS. Q. 109 (1998)..
67
     A “discount factor” is a mathematical factor structured to reflect the degree of 
patience of a player.  It represents the present value today of a payoff in a future period.  
A discount factor of 1 means that future payoffs are valued equally to present payoffs.  A 
discount factor of .75 means that future payoffs are valued at 75% of present payoffs.  A 
high discount factor indicates patience, while a low discount factor indicates impatience.  
Discount factors should be contrasted with “discount rates” applied to future payoffs in 
order to reduce them to a present value, where the discount factor equals 1/(1+r), with r 
representing the discount rate.  Therefore, discount factors are less than 1 (assuming a 
positive discount rate).  A low discount rate corresponds to a high discount factor.  For 
example, a discount rate of 10% would result in a discount factor of approximately 91%.  
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the second order collective action problem, suggesting that players would not retaliate 
against a defector.68  The transaction cost problem, compared to transaction benefits, with 
increasing numbers of players is merely a conjecture and seems to be countervailed by 
the possibility of economies of scale and scope.  The second order collective action 
problem is based on the collective rationality issue discussed above.  With respect to 
heterogeneous discount rates, much depends on the ability to discriminate among players, 
and the degree of variation among players.  Generally, cooperation would depend on the 
discount rate of the least patient state, which would result in the possibility that states 
with high discount factors (low discount rates) would find it useful to exclude states with 
low discount factors from certain cooperative arrangements.
c. Information
The relative scale of information in the international system is somewhat different 
from that in a municipal setting.  That is, the cost of producing and distributing 
information regarding state behavior may be a much smaller fraction of the utility of 
cooperation in the international setting than it may be in municipal inter-firm contexts.  
Furthermore, there are significant asymmetries among states in terms of the relative cost 
and value of producing information.  Epistemic communities among government officials 
may play an important role in information transmission.
There are significant differences between a bilateral game and an n-player game, 
and between an n-player game with bilateral retaliation and one with multilateral 
retaliation.  Under bilateral retaliation, information problems are significantly reduced.  
As stated above, our model assumes bilateral retaliation, but multilateral retaliation 
would sustain cooperation in a wider range of circumstances.  
Under multilateral retaliation, we are concerned about the ability of players to 
find out about the compliance or defection history or characteristics of other players.  On 
the one hand, it may be costly for an individual to find out for himself the history of 
many other players.  On the other hand, the potential responses of many other players, if 
engaged, may add to the disincentives for defection.  There are economies of scale and 
scope in this type of system, which may countervail increased information costs that exist 
in an n-player setting.69
As Milgrom, North and Weingast argue with respect to the non-state institutions 
that enforced compliance among early medieval merchants, “It is the costliness of 
generating and communicating information—rather than the infrequency of trade in any 
We discuss below the circumstances under which a state might be thought to have a high 
or low discount factor.
68
    Oye, supra note 63, at 18-19.
69 See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Moral Economy of Communities:  
Structured Populations and the Evolution of Pro-Social Norms, 19 EVOLUTION & 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3, 11-14 (1997).
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particular bilateral relationship—that, we argue, is the problem that the system of private 
enforcement was designed to overcome.”70
Kandori explains that informal enforcement mechanisms fall into two categories:  
those that use personal enforcement and those that use community enforcement.  These 
correspond to what we have been referring to as bilateral retaliation and multilateral 
retaliation.  Kandori examines circumstances in which social norms work to support 
efficient outcomes in infrequent transactions—absent iteration that can allow personal 
enforcement, but under circumstances where community enforcement may occur.71  This 
differs somewhat from what we have assumed about the CIL context, but there may be 
circumstances in which multilateral retaliation could substitute for iteration.  Kandori 
argues that “for a social norm to be sustainable, it must provide proper incentives to the 
members in every respect.”72  Where members of a community can observe each other’s 
behavior, community enforcement works in much the same way as personal 
enforcement.73  Kandori assumes this is the case in small communities.  We might 
suggest that the global community can be understood as a small community in this sense.  
CIL rules generally involve matters that are public knowledge and are reported in the 
press.  Imagine a municipal community where each individual’s behavior is subject to 
journalistic and intelligence investigation.
Kandori assumes private information that is not shared among community 
members.  When observability is not perfect, private information regarding compliance 
with a norm, as well as the distribution of the private information, will be more 
complicated, and costly.  Cooperation may be difficult to sustain because the community 
may not have defined adequately the social norm or the determination and labeling of 
defectors.  Kandori shows, in theoretical terms, that even where an agent does not have 
any direct information of other agents’ behavior vis-à-vis other members of the 
community, cooperative behavior can sometimes be sustained.  In the CIL game, with 
seemingly greater relative ability to observe treatment of third parties compared to private 
society, we would expect a greater basis for cooperation.  
Of course, multilateral sanctions are dependent on information regarding 
defection, and a judgment that the subject has violated the relevant norm.  Information 
may be a trivial problem in certain areas of CIL, but a difficult problem in others.  
Various institutional responses are possible to provide greater certainty in judging 
violations.  Judgments can depend on individual state determinations, or on community 
views, or consensus, which may be led by a “reputation entrepreneur” or other opinion 
70
   Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions 
in the Revival of Trade:  The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, 2 
ECON. & POL. 1,3 (1990).
71
   Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON. 
STUDS. 63 (1992).  
72 Id. at 64.
73 Id..
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leader.  On the other hand, it can be achieved through an independent institution such as a 
court.  And it must be recalled that in this type of setting, even a court’s views can be 
criticized and challenged.  
Unlike in the municipal setting, the international setting provides no system of 
courts with broad mandatory jurisdiction.  Milgrom, North and Weingast argue that third-
party dispute settlement can assist in developing cooperation.  Third-party dispute 
settlement can solve the following information problem.  If two parties have a dispute, in 
which one accuses the other of defection, how can other members of the community 
determine whether the accusation is true?74   Third-party dispute settlement, along the 
lines of the “law merchant,” may be more valuable to resolve information problems in the 
municipal context among traders than in the international context among states.  First, 
there may be fewer states than there are potential traders in the medieval traders’ setting.  
Second, again, the cost of information about state compliance may be a smaller 
proportion of the value of CIL “transactions.”  Milgrom, North and Weingast conclude 
within the municipal context that, given the lack of empirical evidence about the costs of 
running different kinds of institutions, it is not possible to develop a formal model to 
show that their third-party dispute settlement minimizes information costs.  However, 
they opine that the system seems to incur only the kind of costs that are inevitable and 
seems well-designed to minimize those costs.75
The Milgrom, North and Weingast “law merchant” is a private purveyor of 
information and evaluation.  The players accept its use in order to develop an efficient 
equilibrium.  We might consider the extent to which formal international institutions such 
as the International Court of Justice, the WTO’s dispute settlement process or its Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism fill a similar role in connection with states, and whether 
NGOs such as Amnesty International or the World Wildlife Fund, or informal institutions 
such as the Basle Committee (bank regulation) or the Waasenar Arrangement (export 
controls on dual use commodities), can do so in particular niches.  
We assume perfect information in our model.  This assumption is especially apt 
given our assumption of bilateral retaliation.  However, in order for multilateral 
retaliation to operate, information problems must be overcome.
d. Patience/Discount Factors
In repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, theorists have shown that the degree to which 
players value future payoffs will have an effect on players’ incentives to comply with a 
norm.  All things being equal, the extent to which the player values future payoffs will 
determine the extent to which these future payoffs affect the player’s behavior.76
74
    Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 70, at 8.
75 Id. at 15.
76
   Of course, to the extent that players may exchange future payoffs for present payoffs, 
the patience variable becomes less important, or less diverse.  Thus, where efficient 
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We represent the extent of valuation of future payoffs as a discount factor—a 
factor used to reflect the present value of future payoffs.  The discount factor reflects the 
preference of the player for payoffs now versus payoffs in the future.    We may 
understand the discount factor as a central variable, which interacts with other variables 
such as the per-period magnitude of future payoffs, the relative payoffs of defection 
versus cooperation, the horizon or number of periods predicted, frequency of iteration, 
the number of other players under multilateral retaliation, and multi-sector contact.
e. Horizon:  Duration of Interaction
While it might be argued that the CIL game will continue infinitely, in order to 
emphasize the role of patience, it is useful to assume that the game will be finite, but that 
at any given time it is unknown when it will end.  Thus, we assume a low probability that 
the game will be short.  At any given moment, there will be a long, but finite, horizon.  
Public choice considerations would counsel that horizons vary.  After all, if the 
real interaction is not between states but between governments, we must recognize that 
governments have varying effective horizons.  Governments come and go.  The 
relationship between state and government horizons is to some extent determined by the 
degree of accountability of the government—the degree to which it represents the 
interests of the state.  However, a democracy may have a shorter horizon than a 
dictatorship.  Some states may have more frequent or more imminent elections at 
particular moments.  Separately from the frequency or imminence of elections, we would 
want to model the relative stability of the ruling party or coalition.  Much depends on the 
prospects for reelection, the stability of the dictatorship, and the stability of the 
dictatorship’s policies, including their susceptibility to variation due to corruption.  
Furthermore, it may be useful to examine whether the real actor is neither the state nor 
the government, but a more entrenched bureaucracy.  Transnational networks may have 
greater durability than international networks. We combine this question of an individual 
state’s or government’s time horizon with “patience.”  
f. Iteration:  Frequency and Continuity
Included in the set of assumptions underlying the prisoner’s dilemma is the 
assumption of the isolation of the game under analysis.  However, casual observation of 
international society suggests that there are many linkages,77 with the result that few 
capital markets allow for the exchange of future cash or non-cash payoffs for cash 
payoffs, we would expect the patience variable to be constant across players.  See
77 See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 91 (1984); Ernst Haas, Why Collaborate? 
Issue Linkage and International Regimes 32 WORLD POLITICS 357 (1980); Michael D. 
McGinnis, Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation, 30:1 J. CONFL. 
RES. 141 (1986); Robert E. Tollison & Andrew D. Willett, An Economic Theory of 
Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations, 33 INT’L ORG. 425 
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issues can be isolated.78  Players can bind one another in a variety of ways, including by 
linking the present game to other games in a “supergame.”  
It is generally understood that a mutually beneficial outcome can exist as a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma where the game is repeated, 
subject to conditions relating to the players’ discount rates and the time horizon.79  The 
reason is simple to see.  With repeated play current actions can be conditioned on past 
actions, introducing the possibility of rewarding cooperation and punishing defection.  
Repetition of itself is not, however, sufficient to secure continued cooperation.  If the 
game is repeated a known finite number of times, both players will have an incentive to 
defect in the final period, and the game unravels from there to immediate defection.80  By 
contrast, if the game is repeated indefinitely, then “all players defect every period” will 
remain a subgame perfect equilibrium, but there may be additional subgame perfect 
equilibria, depending on the parties’ discount factors.81
“The ‘folk theorems’ for repeated games assert that if the players are sufficiently 
patient, then any feasible, individually rational payoffs can be enforced by an 
equilibrium.  Thus, in the limit of extreme patience, repeated play allows virtually any 
payoff to be an equilibrium outcome.”82   Under circumstances of high discount factors, 
when players are “patient,” the short-term gain from defection in one play is outweighed 
by the aggregation of even small losses in all future periods.  Fudenberg and Maskin 
show that frequent transactions with the same partner, regardless of the number of 
players, the number of strategies available, or the size of the payoffs, make it possible to 
reach an equilibrium with efficient trading.83
g. Multi-Sector Contact
Firms, and states, operate in multiple markets and encounter other firms, or states, 
in multiple contexts:  as competitor here, as supplier there, as co-conspirator elsewhere.  
Industrial organization economists studying the effect of multi-market contact have found 
(1979).  McGinnis shows formally that in a prisoner’s dilemma “multisupergame” 
players may adopt strategies that create linkages across time and games, providing 
opportunities for cooperation where cooperation would not be possible for isolated 
games.
78 See GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO, ISSUE LINKAGE, CREDIBLE DELEGATION, AND POLICY 
COOPERATION (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2778, May 2001).
79 See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY:  ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 308-369 (1991).
80
   Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 111.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 150.
83
   Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with 
Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533 (1986).
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that this cross-sectoral activity may support cooperation. 84  “With multimarket contact 
collusion can be viable in a set of markets even when in the absence of multimarket 
contact it could not be supported in any of these markets.”85
 “Multimarket contact allows firms to use the threat of a simultaneous punishment 
in more markets, which is stronger than the sum of the independent punishments because 
a firm being punished in one market has a higher marginal valuation of profits, therefore 
it values more the losses from punishments in other markets.”86
One important difference between the commercial context and the international 
relations context is that state relations in the international context almost always cross a 
number of sectors.87  States relate to one another in a variety of contexts, with varying 
roles in each context.  Thus, in one context, State A may be concerned about the scope of 
its territorial sea, while in another context it may be concerned about the scope of its 
responsibilities to protect foreign diplomats.  As a result, while there may be a “territorial 
seas game” that is separate from the “diplomatic immunity game,” these games may be 
linked.  In fact, states regularly link issues in international relations,88 with the result that 
it is not possible to establish precise boundaries for any particular game.
84 See, e.g., D.B. Bernheim & M.D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive 
Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 115 (1990); Corwin Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a 
Source of Power, in “Business Concentration and Price Policy,” NBER Conference 
Report (Princeton University Press 1955); Hitoshi Matsushima, Multimarket Contact, 
Imperfect Monitoring and Implicit Collusion, 98 J. ECON. THEORY 158 (2001); Giancarlo 
Spagnolo, On Interdependent Supergames:  Multimarket Contact, Concavity and 
Collusion, 89 J. ECON. THEORY 127 (1999).
85
   Spagnolo, supra note 84, at 128 (emphasis in original).  Spagnolo shows that when 
players have a concave objective function in respect of profits, inducing wealth effects 
and therefore generating scale economies in cooperation, multi-market contact can 
enhance cooperation.  A concave objective function in this context arises from an interest 
in smoother payoffs, and less interest in unusually high payoffs in any given period.  
There are reasons why a political “manager” might also have a concave objective 
function.  See Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why 
Democracies Cooperate More:  Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements
56:3 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002) (modeling trade agreements as signaling and commitment 
devices in the domestic context of democracies).   In the international relations context, in 
which executives play a two-level game, a concave objective function may arise from 
accountability via elections, or in the trade context, from a desire to avoid disruption to 
particular constituencies.  This is Corden’s “conservative social welfare function.”  W.M. 
CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 107 (1974).
86
   Spagnolo, supra note 84, at 133.
87 See Guzman, supra note 2, at 1869-1870; Snidal, supra note 32, at 939.
88 See note 77, supra.
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Defection in one area may have consequences in another, with the possibility of 
cross-sectoral ostracism or other punishment.  Thus, it is not enough to examine whether 
states have sufficient incentives for compliance within a particular sector; one must also 
analyze the effect of activity in other sectors.  
Matsushima argues that multimarket contact can take the place of perfect 
information as a basis for a stable equilibrium of implicit collusion.  Matsushima shows 
that with multimarket contact, cooperation can take place even under circumstances of 
relatively low discount factors.89
This conclusion suggests that international cooperation in different sectors may be 
mutually supportive, and that there may be a kind of network effect that makes each 
additional instance of cooperation more attractive than it would be absent existing 
instances.90  This game theoretic perspective provides support for the early neo-
functionalist hypotheses regarding international economic integration.91
Again, however, the possibility that the “real” actor is a subnational actor,92 such 
as a bureaucracy with a limited sectoral mandate, may affect the possibility of effective 
multi-sector contact.  This may be a reason why assignment of broad international 
relations authority to centralized ministries of foreign affairs may be useful.  While as 
argued by Downs and Jones,93 a particular state may have multiple reputations, within 
multiple contexts, segmentation need not be complete, so that it may be that defection in 
one context may have consequences within another context.  Without further empirical 
study, it is not possible to know how much segmentation exists in states’ reputations.  
Such study would examine the extent to which different ministries within states, and 
different “epistemic communities” on a transnational basis, communicate across sectors.  
It is important to note, however, that particular segments, such as trade, environment or 
arms control, have within them multiple relationships.  Finally, it may be that 
segmentation or reputation is efficient, allowing different parts of a national government 
to take responsibility for their own relations, and to develop the kind of reputation that 
maximizes returns within the relevant segment.
89
   Matsushima, supra note 84, at 164-65.
90 See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of 
International Institutions, 55:4 INT’L ORG. 761, 764-65 (2001).
91 See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE:  FUNCTIONALISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1968); Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Neofunctionalism: 
Obstinate or Obsolete? 20:1 MILLENIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1 (1991).
92 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 
(1997).
93
   George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and International 
Law, 31 J. LEG. STUDIES 95, 101 (2002) (suggesting that reputation varies by field of 
activity, and that this segmentation reduces the effects of reputation).
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Furthermore, Downs’ and Jones’ argument is explicitly about treaty, not custom.  
In a treaty setting, states might be understood as implicitly accepting only intra-treaty 
remedies for breach.  However, in the custom context, there is no explicit or implicit 
limitation on responsive or remedial action.  Therefore, it may well be that in this more 
delicate and nuanced context, where there is no implicit consent to limitation, states 
would consider themselves less constrained in their responsive or remedial action.  In 
addition, much responsive action in this informal setting is likely to take the form of 
abstention from future transactions, rather than some form of punishment within the 
context of the present transaction.    
Milgrom, North and Weingast, examining the behavior of medieval merchants, 
explain that “if the relationship itself is a valuable asset that a party could lose by 
dishonest behavior, then the relationship serves as a bond. . . .”94   This shadow of the 
future effect is intensified by multi-market contact and perfect information.  The broader 
this effect, the greater the likelihood that individual states will respect individual rules.
4. The CIL Supergame
Our discussion in parts 2 and 3 indicates that there are many possible assumptions 
that we might make in developing a CIL supergame.  As noted above, we choose to focus 
on one such supergame – the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game – for two principal 
reasons.  First, this is a setting in which all of the relevant states prefer formation of and 
compliance with a CIL rule to the other possible outcomes.  Second, it is a setting in 
which each state can gain from deviating from the cooperative outcome and in which 
there are no centralized means to enforce any agreement not to deviate.  
The games we develop allow us to identify plausible circumstances under which 
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma can result in stable and efficient equilibria both 
bilaterally and multilaterally.  Moreover, they show what types of contexts, including 
malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to reach such equilibria.  
The repeated prisoner’s dilemma game has two important features, in common 
with all repeated games. First, the strategies played by each state at time t can be made 
conditional on the history of play up to time t.  Second, these strategies can include the 
possibility of punishment if a state deviates from an agreement to follow a particular 
strategy.    
Consider the game illustrated in Table 1.  In this game, state A is a representative 
state in an n-state group that is considering cooperating on some aspect of their 
international relations—for example, fishing rights, protection of diplomats, 
expropriation, or technology standards. Given that we focus on bilateral rather than 
multilateral punishment, we can confine our attention to a typical bilateral game, played 
between State A and State B, that is embedded in the full n-player game.  If both states 
94
   Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 70, at 1.
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cooperate, it is assumed that state i receives Ci(n).  If both states defect, each receives 
Di(n).  If state A defects while state B cooperates, state A receives GA(n), while if state A
cooperates while state B defects, state A receives LA(n).  
Table 1: A Multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Bilateral Punishment
State B
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate CA(n); CB(n) LA(n); GB(n)
State A
Defect GA(n); LB(n) DA(n); DB(n)
This is a prisoner’s dilemma game when the following is true:
(i) Gi(n) > Ci(n): Both states prefer to defect when the other state cooperates;
(ii) Di(n) > Li(n): Both states prefer to defect when the other state defects;  
(iii) Di(n) < Ci(n): Bilateral cooperation is better for both states than bilateral 
defection.
It follows from (i) – (iii) that Gi(n) > Ci(n) > Li(n).  Each state prefers unilateral 
defection to bilateral cooperation and prefers bilateral cooperation to bilateral defection.  
The multilateral context of this game is captured first, by the implicit assumption that (i)-
(iii) are independent of the number of other states in the multilateral context that are 
playing Cooperate or Defect and second, by the assumption that some or all of the 
payoffs in each of the component bilateral games are functions of the number of states n
in the multilateral context.  The subscripts allow for the possibility of asymmetric payoffs 
to the different states.
Given that conditions (i) – (iii) are satisfied, and the implicit assumption 
regarding states other than A and B, we have the standard result that the Nash equilibrium 
to both the bilateral game in Table 1 and to the overall multilateral game, given that this 
game is played only once, or a finite number of times known in advance to all the 
participants, is that all states play Defect.  In other words, even if a CIL rule is articulated 
it will not be followed. 
Assume instead that the game is repeated indefinitely.  To make this more 
concrete, assume that in any period t state i believes that this game will be played again in 
period t + 1 with probability i < 1.  Further suppose that state i has discount factor Ri, 
where 0 < Ri < 1 is a measure of impatience: the smaller is Ri the less patient state i is –
the more that state i favors current benefits over future benefits.  We can then construct a 
“probability adjusted” discount factor i = i.Ri for each state.
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Now consider whether the strategy combination {Cooperate, Cooperate} can be 
sustained as an equilibrium to the game in Table 1 when it is repeated indefinitely.  For 
this to be the case, {Cooperate, Cooperate} must be a subgame perfect equilibrium.  One 
such strategy profile that has the potential to support such an equilibrium is the grim 
trigger strategy for each state i in each bilateral game:
1. Cooperate in period t if both states have cooperated in all periods up to and 
including t – 1;
2. Defect in period t and all subsequent periods if either state has defected in any 
period prior to t.
As discussed above, an alternative strategy, addressing the problem of collective 
rationality, is “penance.”  Fudenberg and Tirole show that the following “penance” 
strategy profile is “weakly renegotiation proof” (WRP):  “Begin in the cooperative phase 
where both states play Cooperate.  If a single state A switches to Defect, switch to the 
punishment phase for A.  In this phase, state A plays Cooperate and the other state plays 
Defect.  Play remains in this phase until the first time state A plays Cooperate, at which 
point play returns to the cooperative phase.”95  The logic of this strategy is that a state 
having defected from a rule can have the rule reinstated only by accepting a period of 
punishment, in which it cooperates while the other state defects against it.  The penance 
strategy works in the following manner.  A defects once.  B defects subsequently and in 
each future play until A cooperates while B defects.  Then B cooperates, expecting A to 
continue cooperating since B has “stuck with” the “agreed” strategy.
Whether we use the grim trigger or the penance strategy profile, standard analysis 
indicates that we need only consider a single-period defection by a state.96  Suppose, 
then, that state i chooses to Defect in period 0.97  Its return from doing so is:
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If, by contrast, state i chooses Cooperate in every period, its return is:
95
  Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 36, at 180.  See also the “defect for deviate” strategy 
proposed by Mahoney and Sanchirico, supra note 24.
96
  We could also assume with grim trigger that states switch to Defect for a finite number 
of periods T without affecting the qualitative conclusions.
97
  Again, standard analysis indicates that we can always choose the first period in which 
Defect is played as the beginning of the game.
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For Cooperate to be preferable for state i, and therefore sustainable, we must have 
SC > SD which, after some manipulation, requires:
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The “Patience Condition” is that the actual discount factor (i) exceed the critical 
discount factor (*g or *p). In each of these equations, of course, i = A or B.
A necessary but not sufficient condition for cooperation to be sustainable is that 
the critical discount factor is less than unity.  Condition (iii) above gives the familiar 
result that, with the grim trigger strategy, provided the participants to the potential rule 
are sufficiently patient and the probability of continuation is sufficiently high, multilateral 
cooperation is sustainable.  This need not be the case with the penance strategy.  This is 
because 1<p  if and only if Ci(n) > (Gi(n) + Li(n))/2, for i = A, B.  In other words, the 
penance strategy will sustain cooperation only if for both states the single-period return to 
cooperation exceeds the average of the single-period return to cheating and return to 
being punished.  
It should not be thought, however, that grim trigger is necessarily a tougher 
punishment regime than patience and so more able to sustain a cooperative rule.  We note 
that  < gp  if and only if Gi(n) – Ci(n) < Di(n) – Li(n), in other words, if the gain to 
defection when the other state cooperates is less than the gain to defection when the other 
state defects.  The Patience Condition indicates that penance imposes a tougher 
punishment if the gain to defection when the other state cooperates is less than the gain to 
defection when the other state defects.
The Patience Condition can be interpreted in other ways that are directly relevant 
to our analysis. First, CIL is more likely to emerge and be sustainable when the returns to 
cooperation are high relative to non-cooperation and when the returns to unilateral 
defection are low.  Second, CIL is more likely to be formed between relatively patient 
states: those with relatively high discount factors.  Third, CIL is more likely where the 
probability of continued interaction between the participating states is high.  
The important question to which we now turn is that raised by Goldsmith and 
Posner.  Does increasing the number of participants make it tougher to sustain 
cooperation?  For this to be the case it is necessary that *   rises as n increases.
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With some manipulation we can show (suppressing n in the interests of brevity) 
that
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We are interested in the signs of these derivatives:  whether they are positive or negative 
determines whether *  rises as n increases.  This is important since, the higher the critical 
discount factor the less likely it is that the CIL rule is sustainable multilaterally. Note that 
from (i) – (iii) above, all of the bracketed terms (Ci – Di) and so on are positive.  It 
follows that the signs of the derivatives n /*  are determined by the signs of the 
derivatives of the payoffs with respect to the number of states in the multilateral rule.  
The simplest, but probably least likely, case is that in which none of the pay-offs 
are affected by n, that is dGi/dn = dDi/dn = dCi/dn = dLi/dn = 0.  If this is the case, then 
the multilateral CIL rule is no more than the aggregation of a series of independent 
bilateral CIL rules and so is no more difficult to sustain than the individual bilateral rules.
It is more likely, however, that the multilateral context has some force in that at 
least the number of states that are effectively party to the multilateral CIL rule affects 
some of the payoffs.98  This force could derive from the public goods or network aspect 
of the establishment of the CIL rule itself, a point to which we turn below, or more 
98
   For a recognition by the International Court of Justice that even protection of 
diplomats has an important multilateral dimension, see Diplomatic and Consular 
Personnel Case, I.C.J. Reports,  1980 p. 3 at pp. 42-3 (para. 92).  In that case, the ICJ 
made the following statement:  
In recalling yet again the extreme importance of the principles of law [protection
of diplomats] which it is called upon to apply in the present case, the Court 
considers it to be its duty to draw the attention of the entire international 
community, of which Iran itself has been a member since time immemorial, to the 
irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind now before the Court.  
Such events cannot fail to undermine the edifice of law carefully constructed by 
mankind over a period of centuries, the maintenance of which is vital for the 
security and well-being of the complex international community of the present 
day, to which it is more essential than ever that the rules developed to ensure the 
ordered progress of relations between its members should be constantly and 
scrupulously respected.
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generally from the idea that the greater the number of states that form a CIL rule, the 
greater will be the aggregate benefits that flow from that rule.  
However, the situation that is most often considered has the following 
characteristics.  First, the return to each state from cooperation decreases as the number 
of states in the CIL rule increases, so that dCi/dn < 0.  Second, the return to a state from 
defection is greater when there are more states that continue to abide by a CIL rule, so 
that dGi/dn > 0.  Third, non-formulation of a CIL rule leaves states in an autarkic 
situation, so that the returns to non-formulation or total breakdown of a proposed CIL 
rule are the same and independent of the number of states  (dDi/dn  0).  Where this is the 
case, it follows that the critical discount factor is increasing in n so that multilateral CIL 
is, indeed, harder to sustain than bilateral CIL.
This is, however, not the same as saying that such CIL rules are impossible to 
sustain or even highly unlikely to be sustained. The critical condition is, as noted above, 
that each state i that is party to the CIL rule has probability adjusted discount factor i > 
*.  This is more likely to arise if each state believes that the probability of continuation 
i is high and has a high discount factor Ri.  The implication is first, that we are more 
likely to see multilateral CIL among states that have, and are expected to have, 
interactions over an extended period.  Second, multilateral CIL rules are more likely 
between “patient” states, meaning states that tend to value future payoffs more highly 
than others.  Third, multilateral CIL rules are more likely to hold when the relevant 
interactions are frequent.  This is because Ri is a “per period” discount factor and i is a 
“per period” probability.  The shorter the time period between transactions the higher is 
the effective probability adjusted discount factor and so the more likely it is that the i > 
* condition will be satisfied.
Moreover, there are at least two potentially countervailing forces that can work to 
sustain multilateral CIL.  
The first follows from our analysis above.  It is not difficult to imagine 
circumstances in which the gains to unilateral defection fall with n while the share to 
each state from cooperation increase with n--where dGi/dn < 0 and/or dCi/dn >0.  Where 
this is the case the conventional argument is actually reversed.  Multilateral CIL rules are 
easier to sustain than bilateral rules.  
Under what circumstances might this arise?  One possibility99 is that the rule 
relates to the investment by each participating state in the provision of a public good.100
As more states participate, the investment in provision increases as does the benefit to the 
individual state from cooperation.  By contrast, the gains from defection can be expected
99 See, e.g., Robert Pahre, Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, 
38:2 J. CONFL. RES., 326 (1994); Snidal, supra note 32, at 929.
100
    For a discussion of global public goods, see PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:  
MANAGING GLOBALIZATION (I. Kaul et. al, eds. 2003).
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to decrease with n.  The same is likely to be true for policies with strong network effects 
– for example, common international technology standards.101  A single state may gain 
from going it alone but the potential gains are likely to be less the more isolated the state 
is, that is, the more that the state looks like a single stand-out where others adopt a 
common standard.  A third possibility is that there are reputation effects built into Gi(n).  
A state gains from defecting on a rule but the act of defection harms the state’s 
reputation, making it less likely that the state will be able to make agreements with other 
states.  In the context of the game in Table 1, this implies that the gains from current 
defection will tend to decrease with n.
The second countervailing effect arises when states are involved in a series of 
international rules (including treaty rules) with overlapping groups of partners.  In such a 
case, defection on one rule has potentially harmful effects for all of the rules to which a 
particular state is party.  This is similar to the analysis of the potential for multimarket 
contact to maintain tacit agreements between firms.102  Rather than provide a general 
analysis, the basic idea can be illustrated by using a variant of one of the examples from 
Goldsmith and Posner,103 illustrated in Table 2, assuming bilateral punishment and the 
grim trigger strategy profile.104  In this game, cooperation by all states on a particular CIL 
rule gives each state a share 6/n.  Defection by all states gives each a share 4/n.  
Defection by a single state gives that state 4 and leaves the remaining states a share 2/n.
Suppose that there are 2 states, i.e. n = 2.  Then the critical probability adjusted 
discount factor above which a bilateral rule is sustainable is, from the Patience Condition: 
 
( )
2
1
24
342 =	
	
=g
101
   Other areas of international law, including the law of sovereignty, diplomatic 
protection, etc., may exhibit network effects.  These may arise simply from efficiencies 
due to consistency of arrangements.  For a relevant analysis in the corporate law field, see
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81VA. L. 
REV. 757 (1995).  
102
  The classic reference on this is Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 84.
103
  Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1125, table 2.  Goldsmith & Posner’s 
table 2, relating to the protection of coastal fishing boats, appears as follows:
 State i
Attack Ignore
Attack 2, 2 4, 1
State j Ignore 1, 4 3, 3
104
  The more general analysis is available on request.
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By contrast, if there are 4 states the critical discount factor to maintain a multilateral rule 
between all four is:
( )
6
5
14
4/644 =	
	
=g
This case is, in other words, one in which the multilateral rule is more difficult to sustain 
than the bilateral rule.
Now suppose that there are four states and that each state enters into a bilateral 
rule or agreement with one of the other three states as well as a multilateral rule with all 
four.  Each rule has the pay-offs given in Table 2.  Consider the following grim trigger 
strategy.  
1. Cooperate in period t if all states have Cooperated in all periods up to and 
including t – 1; 
2. Defect in period t and all subsequent periods on both rules if any state has 
Defected on either rule in any period prior to t.
Table 2:  A Multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Multi-Sector Contact
 State B
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
n
6
; 
n
6
n
2
;  4State A
Defect 4 ; 
n
2
n
4
; 
n
4
Clearly, if any state is going to Defect it will Defect on both the bilateral and 
multilateral rules, since the strategy calls for its partner to react to defection by defecting 
on both rules.  The returns to the defecting state from defection are:
	

+=	

++	

+
1
38
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24
The returns from continued cooperation are:
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( ) ( )	=	+	 12
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It follows that the critical probability adjusted discount factor above which the 
multilateral and single bilateral rules are sustainable is
( )
10
71,4* =
By the same argument, if a state enters into two bilateral rules and a four-state 
multilateral rule, the probability adjusted critical discount factor is
( )
14
92,4* =
Note that this example has the property that the critical probability adjusted 
discount factor increases as the number of potential partner states increases, making the 
multilateral CIL rule in this example more difficult to sustain as the number of 
participants to the rule increases, as Goldsmith and Posner argue.  However, our example 
also illustrates the countervailing power that derives from states being able to enter into 
bilateral as well as multilateral rules.  In any multilateral context, the critical discount 
factor decreases as the number of bilateral rules that each state enters into increases.  This 
leads to a simple but compelling proposition.  A state can use slack enforcement power in 
bilateral rules to sustain multilateral rules.
The third possibility is related to the second.  Recall that the discount factor 
relates to a particular period of time: the time between “transactions”.  In other words, if 
transactions occur every three months then * is a three-month discount factor, whereas if 
transactions occur every month then * is a one-month discount factor.  To see what this 
means, consider once again the multilateral game of Table 2 with 4 states and assume that 
this game is played every quarter.  Then the critical quarterly probability adjusted 
discount factor above which cooperation is sustainable is 5/6, or 83%.  Now suppose that 
the game is played every month.  The critical monthly probability adjusted discount 
factor to sustain cooperation is again 5/6 or 83%, but this is equivalent to a quarterly 
probability adjusted discount factor of (5/6)3, or 58%.  In other words, multilateral rules 
are more easily sustained when they involve frequent interactions between the member 
states.
These two possibilities can, of course, interact.  States may be able to enter into 
multiple rules, some with frequent interaction and some with infrequent interaction. By 
the same argument as above, a state can use slack enforcement power from rules with 
frequent transactions to sustain rules with infrequent transactions. 
The Customary International Law Supergame
July 13, 2004
37
The implication of this analysis is that there exists a significant set of cases in 
which it will be possible to form multilateral customary rules of international law.  The 
likelihood of formation in any particular circumstance will depend on a number of 
factors, including (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of 
states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states 
involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, including 
whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or 
a network, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance and 
defection, (v) the relative patience of states to realize benefits of long-term cooperation 
compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the 
frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other 
multilateral relationships between the involved states.
5. Implications
The model presented above suggests that CIL may affect behavior, and that it will 
do so to varying extents under varying circumstances.  This model has implications for 
international legal theory, for CIL doctrine, for policy and for research.
a. International Legal Theory Implication:  CIL May Affect Behavior
The discussion in parts 2 and 3 and the model in part 4 suggest that there exists a 
significant set of cases in which CIL will affect behavior.  As we cannot here assess in 
any particular case the actual value to states of cooperation, or their discount rates, or 
many of the other factors included in the model, it is impossible to say with certainty by 
how much, or how often, CIL affects behavior.  But it is equally impossible to say that it 
does not affect behavior, that it seldom does so, or even that it only has marginal effects.  
So, we believe that CIL is plausible.  It seems no less plausible than social norms in the 
domestic context.  In fact, there are reasons to believe that it may be more plausible, 
based on economies of scale and scope in information and multi-sector contact.  On the 
other hand, there are countervailing factors, including the possibility that individuals in
small communities have a greater sense of permanence than governments in international 
society.  Interestingly, this analysis suggests that states generally have an interest in the 
development of domestic political institutions that will instill “patience” in other states.
b. Normative Implications: Institutional Modifications
The prior analysis suggests a number of potential implications for policy.  
“Perhaps game theory’s greatest potential for contributing to international law is to 
provide a rigorous means of describing and articulating important aspects of state 
interaction and cooperation.  The hope is that fully developed game theoretic models will 
help states design law that creates or enhances the conditions for cooperation, if such 
cooperation is desirable.”105
105
   Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law, supra note 2, at 155.
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i. The Role of Regional or Plurilateral Custom
As demonstrated above, the number of states involved in forming a particular 
customary rule may have a significant effect on the ability to form a rule.  As we have 
suggested, this effect will differ in direction, depending on the context.  Therefore, states 
may find that they can develop regional or other plurilateral rules of CIL in circumstances 
where multilateral rules are more difficult to establish.  Regional or other plurilateral 
intensification of relationships, such as in the European Community or the OECD, may 
establish the conditions for greater use of custom.
ii. Network Effects in Institutionalism
International cooperation in different sectors may be mutually supportive, and 
there may be a kind of network effect that makes each additional instance of cooperation 
more attractive than it would be absent existing instances.  This game theoretic 
perspective provides support for the early neo-functionalist hypotheses regarding 
international economic integration, and suggests the potential value of cooperation “for 
its own sake” or in order to facilitate further cooperation.  It also provides theoretical 
support for strategies of “constructive engagement” outside the CIL context.  Network 
effects may be enhanced in regional or other plurilateral contexts, by concentrating and 
intensifying relationships.
iii. The Information Role of NGOs and International Courts
By disseminating information regarding compliance with particular norms, NGOs 
or international organizations may play a critical role in improving information, 
facilitating the development of custom.  In cases of complex rules or facts, where under a 
regime of autointerpretation states may argue over compliance, courts or other 
“independent” third parties may resolve this information problem more definitively.
iv. Custom and Treaty
This article applies the literature of law and social norms in a way that suggests a 
bridge over the gulf between law and social norms.  It recognizes that law on the one 
hand, and social norms on the other hand, are alternative or sometimes complementary 
means of social control, or social cooperation.  It thus suggests the utility of comparative 
institutional analysis106 between law, on the one hand, and social norms, on the other.  
Custom is a mechanism for international “legislation” that requires only a degree 
of consensus,107 not unanimity.  Given the difficulty of establishing multilateral treaties 
106 See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1996); HERVÉ MOULIN, 
COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS:  A GAME-THEORETIC INTRODUCTION (1995).
107
   “Consensus” is here understood as an absence of express objection.
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without significant holdouts, and given the need to avoid free riders, we might understand 
the CIL process as an alternative mechanism for global legislation.  A rule of consensus 
acts as a default rule that promotes compliance, and increases the bureaucratic costs of 
“persistent objectors.”  We recognize that this type of strategy would raise concerns 
regarding democratic legitimacy.  However, this type of legislative technique is not more 
invasive than majority voting, and the “persistent objector” rule allows states to opt-out 
of rules that raise sufficient concern.
There is less of a distinction between CIL and treaty, on the one hand, than there 
is between social norms and either contract or law, on the other hand.  As treaty is in 
legal theory only supported by CIL and by institutions created by treaty, rather than by an 
external state, it is something less than contractual.  In fact, we may understand treaty in 
the international law context as an extension of custom, or of social norms.  It is an 
important extension, with the capacity to specify required performance in greater detail, 
establishing greater agreement on the content of the relevant norm, and thereby 
overcoming important information problems.  Of course, to the extent the treaty specifies 
binding dispute settlement, additional information problems may be overcome.  
Furthermore, treaty has a greater capacity for concreteness than custom, and 
treaty lends itself more to specificity—to rules as opposed to broad standards.  Treaty 
also is more amenable to domestic ratification, which is both a burden in terms of 
efficiency of agreement, and a benefit in terms of accountability.  As in the rules and 
standards context,108 custom may serve as a pathfinder for later-established specific treaty 
rules.  Conversely, treaty structures, including dispute settlement, may serve as an 
institutional setting to promote custom.
Further analysis of the relationship between treaty and custom, and the choice of 
instruments in particular contexts, is beyond the scope of this article.
c. Doctrinal Implications: A Contractual Approach to Opinio Juris
We have not yet directly addressed the argument by Goldsmith and Posner that 
CIL generally does no work—that state behavior is not motivated by CIL, but only by 
self-interest.109  The implication of this argument, not made explicit by Goldsmith and 
Posner, is that CIL does not exist, because CIL doctrine requires practice motivated by 
opinio juris—by CIL.  This argument is subject to several lines of attack.  
i. CIL Rules May Affect Behavior
108
   For an introduction to the rules versus standards discussion in law and economics, 
see Kaplow, supra note 28.  
109
   Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2 at 1131-1133.
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First, our discussion in parts 2, 3 and 4 shows that CIL may affect behavior.  So 
our refutation of the assumption that the n-person prisoner’s dilemma is unlikely to bind 
states shows that it is plausible that state behavior is affected by CIL.  
ii. A Contractual Approach to Opinio Juris
Recall that under the Restatement Third formulation, CIL does not exist without 
opinio juris, or the sense of legal obligation.  However, as D'Amato suggests,110 it seems 
on first analysis that this requirement is circular:  the first state that complies "from a 
sense of legal obligation" must do so erroneously.   There may be a solution to this 
paradox.  
Analogizing CIL to social norms, we might postulate that instead of a "sense of 
legal obligation," the Restatement Third formulation might more correctly refer to an 
"intent to create or accept a rule of law."111  As suggested by the formulation contained in 
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we may in addition 
refer to a "sense of incipient legal obligation."112  CIL may arise in the international 
system in just the way that social norms arise in the domestic setting, with the same 
possible beneficial effects in terms of cooperation and coordination.  The social norms 
analogy suggests, with McDougal, Mendelson, Swaine, and Thirlway113 that we may 
110 ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 
(Cornell 1971).
111
   It is worth noting the relationship of this proposition to the first formulation of 
Kant’s categorical imperative:  “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it should become universal law.”  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK 
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1997) (1785).
112 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 109 (June 27) (“Reliance by a State on a novel right, or an unprecedented 
exception to the principle, might if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a 
modification of customary international law.”).
113
   “[A]t the initial stage of the development of the custom, it is sufficient that the States 
concerned regard the practice as what the Court . . . referred to as ‘potentially norm-
creating’, as conforming to a rule which either already exists or is a useful and desirable 
rule which should exist.’”  Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice 1960-1989 (Part Two), 1990 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 43, citing North Sea 
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20).  See
MCDOUGAL ET AL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 773-74 (1960); Mendelson, supra
note 8; Swaine, supra note 2, at 615 (suggesting that states that initiate a custom might be 
analogized to offerors in a constractual setting, and that this conditional obligation is 
consistent with opinio juris).  See also D’Amato, supra note 110, at 73-102.  And what of 
the circumstances in which initial acts are unreciprocated?  We might understand these 
acts as transaction costs:  as costs of identifying feasible transactions or appropriate 
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understand the initial act of “compliance” not necessarily as an error, but as an offer or an 
act of leadership.  
Consider the development of social norms in the municipal setting.  The first time 
that in Shasta County, a cattle farmer returned a lost calf to its owner without charge, 
despite a lack of legal obligation, there existed no relevant social norm.  Yet that action, 
perhaps recognized by its author to provide efficiencies that would eventually benefit him 
if multilateralized, or perhaps motivated by something else but interpreted as a proposal 
to initiate a rule, began a process that resulted in a “social norm.”
If we understand the "sense of legal obligation" referenced in the Restatement 
Third not as a sense of a fully-formed legal rule, but as a perception or assertion that a 
legal rule would be beneficial, the circularity problem is resolved.  Thus, custom must be 
understood not as mere action, but as an initial or continuing proposal for collective 
action over time, with acceptance evidenced by compliance.  A state may test a proposed 
rule of collective action informally, without the domestic or international costs that 
otherwise might attend the proposal.114  “Run it up the flagpole and see if anyone 
salutes.”  Supporting this approach, a recent report of the International Law Association 
explained that opinio juris requires practice "in circumstances which give rise to a 
legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future."115  This understanding also offers 
a plausible explanation of changing rules of CIL.  In fact, there is no real difference 
between initiation and change:  initiation of a rule is a change from a laissez-faire rule.
Thus, there is a rationale for the opinio juris requirement in terms of general state 
intent:116 mere regularity of action, or mere action based on motives that do not include 
partners.  This is not very different from gift-giving practices in many village and other 
social circumstances.  See Posner, supra note 12, 49-67.
114 See Parisi, supra note 2, at 18 (describing "articulation theories" of CIL in these 
terms).  Parisi suggests special deference to rules chosen prior to conflict:  "Articulations 
that are made prior to unveiling of conflicting contingencies can be analogized to rules 
chosen under a Harsanyian veil of uncertainty."  Id. At 19.  This condition is referred to 
as “stochastic uncertainty.”  However, one might ask why there would be an incentive to 
produce new rules in the absence of conflict.  Perhaps the answer to this problem is that 
the formation of custom is a process occurring over time, and states may participate 
before they know their individual contingent position.  Furthermore, one might question 
whether the veil of uncertainty does not apply even after conflict arises, to the extent that 
states may not know their position in future instances of conflict.
115 COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW, INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL 
REPORT:  STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW §1(i) (2000), 
http://www.ila.hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf, citing Mendelson, supra note 8, at 399.  
116
    What of states that have no relevant intent, or that object to the formation of a legal 
rule?  We will not deal with the doctrinal problem of the persistent objector.  But it seems 
plausible that states would accept a rule of consensus legislation in international custom:  
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the formation of a legal rule, cannot form a rule of CIL.  This is recognized in Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which specifies "international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."117  Goldsmith and Posner seem correct 
that motivation by narrow coincidence of interest (the “required” behavior intrinsically 
benefits the actor) or narrow coercion (of a more direct and unilateral type than the 
retaliation included in our model) are inconsistent with opinio juris and so do not 
contribute to CIL.   But even here, states are likely to act with varying and multiple 
motivations, and it is possible that a CIL rule could be formed despite the fact that some 
states adhere largely due to narrow coincidence of interest or narrow coercion.  
Moreover, it is incorrect to argue that where states act out of self-interest, no opinio juris
can exist.
iii. CIL Rules May be Coterminous with Self-Interest
Second, there is a terminological or doctrinal problem with Goldsmith and 
Posner’s argument, making it seem tautological.  Goldsmith and Posner argue that 
“[s]tates do not comply with CIL because of a sense of moral or legal obligation; rather, 
CIL emerges from the states' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international 
stage.”118  Unless Goldsmith and Posner mean merely to refute the natural law position 
that states comply with international law because of its normative appeal or legitimacy or 
because it is the right thing to do, this argument is a non-sequitur, as legal obligation and 
self-interest are not mutually exclusive categories.  Law and economics has long utilized 
price theory to understand behavior under legal rules, and there is no question that law 
can affect behavior through self-interest.  In the CIL setting, the motivating force is wider 
or potentially longer-term self-interest that flows from making and achieving compliance 
with a rule, or even with rules generally:  narrow or diffuse reciprocity.119
Goldsmith and Posner’s main point here must then be understood simply as the 
application of an assumption of the rationalist model (and one that is subject to at least 
some contention):  that agents only care about their own utility, and therefore would not 
a rule may be formed that binds states that do not object.  For an analysis of consensus-
based decision-making within the GATT/WTO system, see Richard Steinberg, In the 
Shadow of Law or Power:  Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes at the 
GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 399 (2002).
117
   The International Court of Justice seems to ignore the text in favor of a reverse 
reading, seeking to find evidence of international custom in a general practice accepted as 
law.  ROSALYNN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS:  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 18-19 (1994).  Of course, there are other formulations. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (5th ed. 1998).
118
   Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1115. 
119 See Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1 
(1986).
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follow a rule of CIL for intrinsic reasons:  for its own sake.120  However, compliance with 
international law resulting from a sense of legal obligation is consistent with extrinsic
reasons:  there may well be utility in upholding a particular rule, or in upholding the rule 
of law in general.  
iv. Evidentiary Requirements
Third, a marginalist approach would reject the evidence presented by Goldsmith 
and Posner as a basis for their argument.  Their case-based evidence merely suggests in a 
limited range of contexts that there are plausible non-CIL reasons for observed 
behavior.121  Goldsmith and Posner adduce no data that suggests the relative magnitude 
of these reasons, or that suggests the absence of other reasons.  So, they and we have no 
way of knowing that CIL was not a contributing, or alternative sufficient, cause of 
behavior.122  Survey or interview data might be useful to fill this gap.
Of course, to the extent that a particular instance of compliance is fully and 
exclusively explained by true coincidence of interest or coercion, it cannot be argued that 
CIL did any work.  Our theory of CIL examines the effects of broader self-interest based 
on reciprocity, and accepts the possibility of a different kind of coercion by punishment 
for defection, as a normal part of the CIL process.  While CIL is endogenous to states in 
the aggregate, once formed it is at least largely exogenous to the particular state.  As 
explained above, we also find it plausible that there are important circumstances in which 
CIL would have significant effects on state behavior. 
v. Violations or Proposals for Change?
Related to the problem of determining whether a custom has the requisite 
motivation under CIL doctrine is the question of how to deal with anomalous conduct.  
Does the anomaly constitute the initiation of a revised rule of CIL, or a simple 
violation?123  It is important to recognize that no law, in any system, achieves perfect 
compliance.  Thus we must determine another way to evaluate compliance.  The best way 
is to evaluate the extent to which law affects behavior.  Thus, the fact that wars occur 
does not alone mean that the international legal prohibition on the use of force is without 
120
     Recall that there is an important literature on social norms that considers the 
potential for preference modification, holding out the possibility of compliance because 
of modified preferences. See sources cited at note 23, supra.  It may not be necessary to 
choose between static and dynamic preferences:  changing preferences may work 
together with static preferences and self interest.
121 But see Swaine, supra note 2 (raising concerns regarding Goldsmith and Posner’s 
perspective on CIL doctrine).
122 Cf. Guzman, supra note 2, at 1875 (asserting that Goldsmith and Posner’s claim that 
CIL does not affect state behavior goes beyond what the evidence suggests).
123 See D’Amato, supra note 110, at 97 (stating that “an ‘illegal’ act by a state contains 
the seeds of a new legality”).
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effect, just as the fact that murders occur does not mean a domestic proscription of 
murder is meaningless.  Goldsmith and Posner argue that variations in levels of 
compliance suggest that no multilateral rule exists, or affects state behavior.124  However, 
we would expect systematic circumstantial variations in compliance with respect to all 
laws.  That is, in order to determine that CIL exists, or that we as social scientists should 
pay attention to it, it need not in every case determine behavior, so long as it may do so in 
some set of marginal cases.  In game theoretic terms, even a small effect of international 
law could affect the payoffs from compliance, potentially tipping the balance in favor of 
compliance in a marginal case.  
Furthermore, in order to maintain the dynamic, evolutionary character of CIL, it is 
necessary that any theory of CIL allow for some violations of existing rules to be 
understood as proposals for the establishment of new rules.125  This is indeed a subtle and 
difficult distinction, but it is necessary in any decentralized system.  Thus, we should not 
demand that CIL command absolute compliance, or be inflexible.   In fact, one might 
argue, as some do about the common law, that one of its great virtues is its dynamism.  
d. Research Implications: An Empirical Research Agenda
Theory alone tells us little about the world.  The next step is to develop and test 
hypotheses based on the theory of CIL elaborated here.
i. Assessing the Patience/Horizon of States
In empirical research, it would be useful to determine parameters or proxies by 
which to assess the patience (including the horizon) of states and governments, and to 
regress these parameters against measures of compliance.  Is political stability associated 
with patience, and do we see greater compliance with CIL by states with greater political 
stability?  Are democratic states, or states with better developed financial markets, more 
patient?  Are autocratic states more patient because they are not concerned about election 
cycles?  Do we see greater amounts of violation of law before an election than after?  Is 
patience determined by a bell curve, in which strong autocracies and stable democracies 
are patient, and those in between are not?  Are corrupt governments “impatient”?  What 
about more-or-less independent bureaucracies that may be charged with action that 
determines compliance with specific rules of CIL?  Can these independent bureaucracies 
exhibit greater patience than their elected governments?  These conjectures are linked to 
liberal states theory,126 as well as to theories of transnational governmental networks.127
In fact, the correct level of analysis for compliance with certain rules of CIL, in terms 
124
   Goldsmith & Posner 1999, supra note 2, at 1157.
125 See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (4th ed. 1997).
126 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 538 (1995).
127 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOR. AFF. 183 (1997).
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both of patience and information transmission, may be the bureaucratic division, rather 
than the state.  
ii. Proxies for Payoffs
Once we have developed empirical methods of measuring patience, it would be 
necessary to develop proxies for payoffs from violation and compliance, in order to know 
determine whether compliance occurs as predicted by the model described here.
iii. Payoff Structure
Is CIL more likely to be formed under circumstances involving public goods or 
networks, where the value of cooperation may rise with the number of players?
iv. Network Externalities in International Law:  More Relationships 
Make Each Relationship More Reliable
Do we see an acceleration of custom, or a tipping point at which sufficient 
relationships are established to make compliance with CIL more likely?  Is there a 
synergy between treaty and CIL?  This hypothesis might be tested by examining the 
relationship between entry into treaties and compliance with CIL.  Again, the possibility 
of network externalities is inconsistent with a disaggregation of the state into independent 
functional components. 
v. Regional Custom
To what extent can we identify regional or other plurilateral CIL, and how does it 
compare in terms of compliance to universal CIL?  
vi. Information
Is there a relationship between the establishment of NGOs that enhance 
information regarding compliance and defection, or the establishment of adjudicative 
bodies, and compliance with CIL? 
6. Examples
As we note in the body of this article, our purpose is merely to elaborate a theory 
that shows the plausibility of stable and efficient equilibria in a CIL n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma.  We did not set out to prove that such stable and efficient equilibria exist in 
nature, or to prove any of the hypotheses that flow from our model.  However, it is 
useful, by way of illustration rather than proof (hand-waving empiricism) to set out some 
examples of circumstances that can plausibly be characterized as international n-person 
prisoner’s dilemmas, rather than circumstances of intrinsic self interest, narrow coercion, 
a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma, or a bilateral coordination game.  We hasten to note that 
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our characterization of these examples is dependent upon subjective judgment as to the 
payoff structure that these circumstances may entail.  However, without empirical proxies 
for payoffs, it is not possible to do better.
Much of international law relates to the allocation of authority, or responsibility 
for harm.  These types of rules may be analogized to rules of property and tort.   So, for 
example, iconic CIL rules such as diplomatic immunity, sovereign immunity, territorial 
sovereignty, and the territorial sea, may be understood in terms of allocation of authority, 
which may be assimilated to property.  Rules such as responsibility for harm to aliens, or 
responsibility for environmental harms to other states, may be assimilated to tort.  
The strategic context for formation of property or tort rules depends on a number 
of parameters.  These parameters include the costs and benefits of the resource or the 
potential harm, the degree of natural excludability and the cost of artificial exclusion, the 
degree of rivalry of consumption, the degree of bilateral monopoly, and the transaction 
costs of negotiation.  We outline below five examples that seem to follow the prisoner’s 
dilemma structure.  However, it is not possible through this impressionistic description to 
determine the payoff structure of these games.
a. Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
Under the traditional “absolute” theory of sovereign immunity, which was applied 
by the U.S. until the 1952 “Tate Letter,” states may engage in “sovereign” acts or in 
“commercial” acts, and still enjoy jurisdictional immunity from foreign courts.  With the 
rise of state trading and international commerce, this resulted in greater frequency of 
disappointed private persons who had dealt with foreign states only to find that they had 
no legal recourse.  
This state of affairs may be characterized as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma as 
follows.  Each state individually would be better off, in terms of its potential 
responsibility to private persons, maintaining the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.  
However, if all states take this position, then commercial enterprises are harmed in a 
greater amount, trade is diminished, and global welfare is reduced.  There may be a 
degree of asymmetry due to differences in utilization of state trading.  The Soviet Union 
and its satellites favored absolute immunity.    
During the 20th century, states like the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and most 
trading states, adopted the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity, which holds that 
states lack immunity for acts of a commercial nature.  When states adopted the restrictive 
theory, they accepted the possibility of lawsuits in other states based on the restrictive 
theory.  If a state were to decline to adopt the restrictive theory, or renege on adoption of 
the restrictive theory, and claim absolute immunity, they would be required to grant 
immunity to foreign states, reverting to the less efficient status quo (grim trigger).  States 
therefore had sufficient incentives to “cooperate” in enhancing global welfare by 
adhering to and continuing to adhere to the restrictive theory.  
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When the first state shifted from the absolute to the restrictive theory, it was 
possible that other states could have claimed a violation of the traditional rule of CIL:  
absolute immunity.  Instead, they gradually accepted the restrictive theory.
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity may have some network 
characteristics, at least after some number of states adopt it.  For example, once most 
states have adopted the restrictive theory, adoption of the absolute theory by an outlier 
would leave the adopting state open to lawsuits in many other states, while rendering it 
unable to apply the restrictive theory to other states.    
b. Cross-Border Environmental Harm
The rule of sic utere tuo, adopted in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,128 is derived 
from, and remains akin to, the early law of nuisance.129  In allocating responsibility to the 
source state with respect to transboundary pollution, it requires the internalization of 
externalities.  We may understand this rule, like the coordinate domestic law of nuisance, 
to respond to a collective action problem.  Each individual state has incentives to 
externalize pollution if it fails to take into account harm to downwind or downstream 
states.  The Coase theorem, criticizing Pigou, teaches that every externality need not be 
internalized.  However, there will be transaction cost contexts in which internalization is 
useful.  
The case of transboundary pollution may be understood using the prisoner’s 
dilemma, assuming that global welfare may be increased if each state internalizes 
externalities in making decisions about their pollution.  Each state individually has 
incentives to violate this rule.  The CIL rule of sic utere tuo arose in order to establish a 
rule of internalization.  It is enforced by the threat of grim trigger, in the form of a 
“pollute thy neighbor” rule, or by the implicit threat of smaller retaliation along the lines 
of penance.  The sic utere tuo rule applies where pollution crosses a single border, as well 
as where it crosses multiple borders.  Furthermore, the transboundary pollution problem, 
like the nuisance problem, is one where there may be economies of scale in uniformity of 
arrangements.  Therefore, this is not simply a bilateral game.
128
   Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941).  The principle of 
sic utere tuo was included as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, UN Conference 
on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, June 16, 1972, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14, princ. 21, 11 ILM 1416 (1972). See also Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration. See UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 2, 
31 ILM 874 (1992). 
129 See also International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law, Chapter VI of the Report of the 55th Session of the 
International Law Commission, General Assembly 58th Session, Supplement 10, A/58/10 
(2003).
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The emergence of the sic utere tuo rule in international law could plausibly follow 
a similar path to the emergence of the coordinate rule, or other property rights, in 
domestic law.130
To the extent that a specific type of environmental protection is inexhaustible 
(whether or not it satisfies the other criterion to be a public good and is non-excludible), 
such as the ozone layer, it may be that the benefits of participation rise with the number 
of states that participate.  Not all environmental goods will have the same payoff 
structure, and so the sic utere tuo rule would require extensive analysis.
c. Territorial Sovereignty and Non-Acquisition of Territory by Use of Force
The general and specific rules associated with territorial sovereignty may also be 
modeled, like property rights, as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma.  In particular, during 
the last century, the customary international law rule against acquisition of territory by 
force seems to have met with stronger compliance.131  We may understand this principle 
as a disincentive for the use of force.  If states are restrained by a principle of non-
acquisition, they will have weaker incentives to use force.  How can we understand the 
emergence of this principle?
Each state individually has incentives to retain flexibility to acquire territory 
through the use of force.  However, each state also wishes, defensively, to remove the 
flexibility of other states to acquire its territory, or perhaps that of others, through the use 
of force.  Each state has incentives to defect, but refrains from doing so due to fear of 
retaliation in other areas, or in the narrower area of acquisition of territory.  Again, we 
can see that either grim trigger or penance may serve to maintain the equilibrium of non-
acquisition by force.  
130 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 347, at 350 (1967).  See also  B.C. Field, The Evolution of
Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and 
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1985); R.S. Hartman, A 
Note on Externalities and the Placement of Property Rights: An Alternative Formulation 
to the Standard Pigouvian Results, 2 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 111 (1982); John Umbeck, 
Might Makes Rights:  A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property 
Rights, 19 ECON. INQ. 38 (1981); David Ault & Gilbert Rutman, The Development of 
Independent Rights to Property in Tribal Africa, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 183 (1979); John 
Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J. LAW & ECON.
163 (1977); Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  A Study of the American 
West, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 163 (1975).
131
   Mark Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm:  International Boundaries and the Use 
of Force, 55:2 INT’L ORG. 215 (2001).
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This problem does not seem to have the characteristics of a commons or a cartel.  
That is, it does not appear that the incentives to violate increase with the number of states 
that comply.  If many states had designs on the same territory, as in colonial times, this 
might be the case, and perhaps is the reason that a rule against acquisition by force only 
arose more recently.  Today it appears that where a state covets other territory, it is only a 
neighbor’s adjacent territory.  This rule may have security benefits that rise with the 
number of states that adhere.  That is, the greater the number of states that adhere, the 
lower the incentives to attack and therefore the lower each state’s defense budget must 
be.  Thus, it is plausible that this rule would result in increasing incentives to comply with 
rising numbers of adherents.
d. Territorial Jurisdiction
Customary international law includes the norm of territorial jurisdiction.  Each 
state has jurisdiction over conduct within its territory.  There is some dispute regarding 
the scope for “extraterritorial” jurisdiction, usually relating to conduct abroad that has 
adverse effects within the territory of the state seeking to assert jurisdiction.  According 
to sections 402-403 of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law, and according to a number of states and scholars, there are substantial 
limits on the right of a state to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.  According to the 
Restatement, states may not exercise jurisdiction where it would be “unreasonable” to do 
so in light of the various connections and interests involved.   For our purposes, the only 
important fact is that there is some arguable limit.  We can understand this limit within 
the prisoner’s dilemma model.  It is noteworthy that, while the U.S. has on occasion 
asserted the right to apply its law “extraterritorially,” it has always been at significant 
diplomatic cost, and has often been subject to diplomatic adjustment.
We may assume that each state would prefer to exercise jurisdiction without limit, 
in order to affect circumstances that may impose negative externalities on its citizens.  
This is in some sense the reverse Coasian position of the sic utere tuo story.  Each state is 
restrained by the fear of reciprocation or retaliation, resulting in a stable and efficient 
equilibrium.
It might be argued that the territorial jurisdiction problem raises commons issues.  
The more states that adhere to a rule of territoriality, the greater the benefits, in terms of 
regulatory geographic scope, to a violating state.  On the other hand, compliance with a 
rule of territoriality would generally be aligned with rejection of foreign 
“extraterritoriality.”  So, it may be that the benefits of violation do not rise with the 
number of states that comply.   It is notable that there is little consensus on the existence 
or content of a rule of customary international law in this field. 
e. Piracy
Under customary international law, piracy is subject to enforcement action by any 
state.  This is an important exception to the general principle of flag state jurisdiction, 
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under which the flag state would be the only state entitled to take action against its vessel.  
The prisoner’s dilemma story here goes as follows.  The public good is secure shipping, 
enjoyed by all states.  While no state is required to contribute to the public good in 
positive enforcement terms, each state is required to contribute by in effect ceding 
exclusive jurisdiction over its flag vessel.  The security of public shipping may to some 
extent be characterized as a public good.  Furthermore, net payoffs would seem to 
increase with the number of adherents.
7. Conclusions
This article shows the rational plausibility of CIL.  It thus serves as a basic 
defense of the international law system.  Indeed, this article presents not just a theory of 
CIL, but also a theory of international law more generally.  The theory presented here is 
based on methodological and normative individualism.  It thus departs substantially from 
the airy idealism of natural law theory.  It serves as a positive social scientific theoretical 
basis for international legal positivism and a nuanced realism, basing law on the action of 
states or their agents in pursuit of their self-interest, broadly understood.132  It shows that 
CIL, and with it treaty law, is something of a levitation trick.  It therefore rests not on a 
rock-solid natural law basis of divine principles, but on a fabric of rational acts, woven 
through a multiplicity of relations over time.
Some may ask, is this article about law, or is it only about social order, labeled 
“law.”  In a sense, of course, this article does not need to distinguish CIL from other 
forms of cooperation--and indeed the basic model is generic, although we make 
assumptions to accord with the CIL system, such as the general doctrinal rule of bilateral 
retaliation. The goal of this article was to develop a model that would generate interesting 
hypotheses about compliance with CIL. In this regard, our model should be compared 
with Goldsmith-Posner's approach, which would suggest that there are no interesting 
hypotheses about CIL because it cannot affect behavior. More particularly, Goldsmith 
and Posner provide no analysis of the circumstances under which the n-person prisoner's 
dilemma, or the bilateral prisoner's dilemma, might yield stable and efficient equilibria. 
In that sense, our paper is quite different, and presents the possibility for a progressive 
research program in CIL. 
So, while it is true that our basic model is a model of cooperation, and it applies to 
CIL, to treaty, and to other forms of international cooperation, there are some distinctive 
and important aspects of the CIL supergame that do not apply to general cooperation. 
First, CIL rules may serve as equilibrium-selection devices, providing a greater 
possibility for a stable equilibrium. Second, designation as CIL serves to incorporate a 
substantial set of default rules that fill in a large portion of the “incomplete contract” 
regarding many aspects of the obligation, including the scope of remedies for violation. 
132
   This article does not by any means challenge the theory that law can affect behavior 
by modifying preferences.  It merely presents a theory that does not depend on modifying 
preferences.
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Third, it may be that designation as CIL serves to link compliance with any particular
CIL rule to others in order to widen the possible scope of retaliation to fields that might 
not be considered “legitimate” otherwise. In this last connection, we might say that 
designation as CIL increases the returns to compliance by placing at stake the general 
sense of international legality. That is, if state A can be a scofflaw in one sector, what 
prevents state B from being a scofflaw in an area that injures state A? In this sense, there 
is a possibility for implicit multilateral retaliation, even if formal CIL doctrine does not 
permit multilateral retaliation. 
This article also serves as a refutation of the central claim of political science 
realism with respect to international law:  that it is epiphenomenal.  This article shows 
that law may well be a social expression of rules that achieve real collective goals, are 
backed by real sanctions, and have real behavioral effects.  It is a strange realism that 
would ignore this.  
If social norms theory in the domestic sphere finds social norms attractive as a 
mechanism for production and enforcement of rules, perhaps CIL holds promise as an 
alternative to treaty.  Perhaps the main distinguishing feature, and potential value, of CIL 
is systemic.  That is, although we have assumed sectoral divisions for modeling purposes, 
international law may also be understood as a set of linked games, or one extensive game.  
Once a particular rule is absorbed into the CIL system, or is established through treaty, it 
may benefit from linkage to other rules of CIL, and of treaty.133  The special nature of 
legal rules may derive simply from their reception into this linked system.  It is order and 
law.
Like all positive social science, this theory has normative implications.  CIL has 
advantages and disadvantages as a process for making rules.  As states identify these 
advantages and disadvantages in particular contexts, they may decide in some contexts to 
facilitate the development of CIL through institutional modifications.
* * *
133 See Swaine, supra note 2 (“states do not, in fact, interact solely with respect to one 
rule or the other, and it is also possible to understand their interaction with respect both to 
an individual rule and to the system of customary international law”).
